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Corporate crime is an area of criminal law that has swiftly gained momentum in South Africa, 
more specifically the cartel offence of tender collusion, particularly among the larger 
corporations within the construction industry. 
 
It is often debated as to whether it is more desirable to punish the company or the individual 
responsible for engaging in prohibited practices as a company’s thinking and acting is done by 
its directors and employees. In recent years it has become widely accepted that it is 
insufficient to only punish the corporate body that is guilty of committing a corporate crime 
and not the individuals within the corporate bodies who actually commit the crime. Hence, the 
introduction of a provision dealing with criminal liability within the Competition Amendment 
Act 1 of 2009 appears to be an ideal mechanism to safeguard companies and manage cartel 
activities. Whether such prosecutions are suitable under the umbrella of criminal law, 
competition law or company law remains a contentious point and one that this dissertation 
seeks to evaluate. It would appear that the statutes governing this area of law, in their current 
form, present practical concerns which would need to be remedied in order to provide an 
effective solution to the problem of cartel conduct. 
 
This dissertation seeks to critically analyse the liability imposed on South African companies 
for the cartel offence of tender collusion and the offending company’s rights to hold its 
directors personally, criminally and civilly accountable with reference to specific statutory 
provisions. It will evaluate circumstances under which an interested party may recover 
damages or recoup losses suffered by the company, in the form of substantial fines paid, from 
executives/directors or former executives/directors, in situations where a company is fined or 
could potentially be fined for its involvement in tender collusion. It will enlighten directors 
who wish to engage in cartel conduct, of the consequences of their actions and alert offending 
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The South African economy has experienced substantial corporate activity and development 
in recent years; however a consequence of this expansion has been the rapid increase of 
corporate criminality. It is said that ‘while the 1990s was a decade of booming markets and 
booming profits, it was also a decade of rampant corporate criminality’.1 ‘There is an 
emerging consensus among corporate criminologists, which is that corporate crime and 
violence inflicts far more damage on society than all street crime combined.’2 It is said that 
while the South African government spends billions of Rands year after year in bringing 
criminals to justice but of those billions little, if any, is spent on bringing white collared 
corporate criminals to justice.3 
 
Corporate crime is an area of criminal law that has swiftly gained momentum in South Africa 
but more specifically, the cartel offence of tender collusion, particularly among the larger 
corporations within the construction industry. South African competition authorities have 
seen major increases in cartel cases over the past years. It is argued that ‘cartel activities are 
tantamount to theft’4, which is a criminal offence. Therefore the individuals responsible 
should be held personally accountable and used as an example of the government’s and 
business sectors’ intolerance towards anti-competitive behaviour in a free market.5 Instead, 
these large corporations face a host of fines for anti-competitive behaviour while the 
individuals actually engaging in the cartel conduct, are absolved from liability and face no 
ramifications for their anti-competitive behaviour.  
 
In order for the law to effectively confront cartel conduct, the individuals responsible need to 
be held accountable and personally liable for their cartel conduct.6 It can be debated that in 
most instances it is the directors of large corporations in South Africa who make the 
                                                          
1 Singh, S ‘Corporate Crime and the Criminal Liability of Corporate Entities’ available at   
www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No76/No76_10PA_Singh.pdf, accessed on 28 February 2014. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Makhubele, D ‘Fighting over breadcrumbs - cartels and the Competition Act 89 of 1998: feature’ (2014) 539    
  De Rebus 20-22. 
5 Shahim, C (2013) ‘Colluding Constructions: Lucky break?’ available at 
  http://www.polity.org.za/article/colluding-constructions-lucky-break-2013-07-18, accessed on 28 February 




executive decisions to participate in such anti-competitive behaviour.7 These decisions are 
often unbeknown to shareholders and in most cases fuelled by the prospect of a higher 
performance return based on the company’s success. It is often debated as to whether it is 
more advantageous to punish the company or the individuals responsible for engaging in 
prohibited practices. This is due to the fact that a company is an artificial legal person that 
acts through the medium of its directors and employees who act on its behalf. 
  
In recent years it has become widely accepted that it is insufficient to solely punish the 
corporate body guilty of committing a corporate crime.8 Punishment should be extended to 
the individuals within the corporate body in question, who authorise or commit the crime, 
often in return for some kind of benefit. It is evident that there is a growing need among the 
victims of such crimes and the corporate bodies involved for the law to hold the individuals 
responsible criminally liable, given the important roles they play within the company and the 
nature of their office.  
 
It is unjust to exclusively punish companies as a result of the cartel behaviour of their 
directors and it is difficult for them to recover compensation or reimbursement for the 
suffered loss by means of the legal system.9 In most instances, the individuals who have 
committed such crimes leave the exposed or guilty company, simply take up employment 
with competitors and continue relatively unscathed by the effects of their conduct. However, 
it is submitted that the introduction of the prospect of imprisonment would act as a deterrent 




The history of apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices in South Africa has 
resulted in inadequate restraints against anti-competitive trade practices, unjust restrictions on 
full and free participation in the economy, and excessive concentrations of ownership and 
control within the national economy. In order for an economy to flourish, the development of 
credible competition law, and the establishment of effective structures capable of 
administering that law, are necessary for a functioning and efficient economy. An efficient, 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ngobese, C ‘NUMSA: dismiss all Directors and CEOs’ available at http://www.numsa.org.za/article/numsa-
dismiss-all-directors-and-ceos-2013-06-25/, accessed on 28 February 2014. 
9 Makhubele (note 4 above) 20. 
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competitive economic environment should be focused on development and thereby capable of 
balancing the rights and interests of corporations, directors, employees, owners and 
consumers in order to benefit all South Africans. 
 
Cartels are detrimental to economies all over the world, predominantly in developing 
countries where money and resources are scarce, and laws regulating cartel conduct are 
under-developed or lack sufficient enforcement mechanisms to have any real deterrent 
value.10 The excessive existence of cartel activity firmly rooted within such countries can 
have severe implications on the economy as a whole.  
 
The Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the ‘Competition Act’) was introduced to fundamentally 
address concerns relating to the establishment of effective competition law policies and 
inequalities in the South African economy. The legislature has made specific reference to 
such policy goals in sections 2(c) and section 2 (f) of the Competition Act, as follows: 
 
‘The purpose of the Competition Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in 
order- 
a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans; 
d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and recognise the 
role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of 
historically disadvantaged persons.’11 
 
Cartel behaviour is regulated by the provisions of section 4 of the Competition Act which sets 
out rules for business in relation to competitors, suppliers and customers. ‘Certain activities, 
which would have a major negative effect on competition, are not allowed’12 in terms of the 
                                                          
10  Markus Merdian The Criminalisation of Cartel Conduct in South Africa and the United Kingdom (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013). 
11   89 of 1998. 
12 Competition Commission ‘The Competition Act - An Introduction (Book1) Brochure’ (2001) available at    
      http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/AttachedFiles/MyDocuments/Nov-01-The-Competition-Act-An   
      Introduction-Book1.pdf, accessed on 3 October 2014. 
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Competition Act. These activities include the cartel offence of tender collusion, specifically 
prohibited by section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act, which classifies such conduct as a 
restrictive horizontal practice.13 Section 4 of the Competition Act defines cartel activities as –  
 
‘An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an association of 
firms, is prohibited if it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and if – 
a)  it has the effect of substantially preventing, or lessening, competition in a market, unless a 
party to the agreement, concerted practice, or decision can prove that any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from it outweighs that effect; or 
b)  it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices: 
(i) directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition; 
(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of 
goods or services; or 
(iii) collusive tendering.’14 
 
It is important to note that the Competition Act only makes provision for the imposition of 
administrative fines on firms that engage in cartel activity in terms of section 59(2) in an 
effort to act against cartels.  Criminal sanctions are used as a last resort in a Constitutional 
State, and as such its introduction into competition law requires some justification.15 
Competition law, unlike criminal law, is designed to deter potential offenders from cartel 
conduct and not to punish offenders retrospectively.16 Although administrative fines seem 
relatively high, they have not proven to be effective in deterring cartel conduct. Furthermore, 
administrative fines may have unwarranted effects on the company, its employees, customers 
and the public at large.17 Conversely, the introduction of criminal sanctions for individuals 
would directly affect the decision-makers responsible for a firm engaging in cartel conduct 
because their personal finances and liberty would be at stake. In this light, the threat of 
imprisonment, as opposed to an administrative fine, appears to be an effective deterrent. 
However the fact that the introduction of criminal sanctions against directors may also have 
some unwarranted effects cannot be ignored. 
                                                          
13 89 of 1998. 
14 Section 4(1) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 - ‘horizontal relationship’ means a relationship between 
competitors according to section 1 of the Competition Act. 
15 Letsike, T ‘The criminalising of cartels – How effective will the new Section 73A of the Competition 
Amendment Act be?’ (2013) available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Seventh-
Annual-Conference-on-Competition-Law-Economics-Policy/Paralle l-2B/THE-NEW-SECTION-73A.pdf, accessed 






The recent increase in corporate crime is evident particularly in the construction industry as 
15 of South Africa’s largest construction corporations currently face a host of civil fines.18 
This serves to highlight the extent of the entrenchment of cartel arrangements in South 
African industries. Recent cases that have gone before the Competition Commission have 
sparked a widespread debate about the extent to which directors may be held liable ‘for the 
actions of the companies that employ them, following a guilty finding’19 by the Competition 
Commission. It has been suggested that the ‘buck’ or liability ‘should not stop with the 
corporations’20 but that punishment should be extended to the individuals actually involved in 
cartel activities, i.e. the directors.21 Thus there is a definite shift in focus to criminal 
investigations linked to contraventions of the Competition Act. As public custodians of the 
South African economy, competition authorities are expected to uphold stringent standards of 
fair trade in a free market.22 However, there is concern that the agreements reached by the 
Competition Commission in respect of the quantum of the fines imposed on guilty companies 
makes the fight against collusive tendering futile as it allows those directly responsible to 
escape liability unless good corporate governance exercised.  
 
The Competition Act provided the Competition Commission with the power to examine and 
deal with the actions of companies involving prohibited conduct, it did not however allow the 
Competition Commission to scrutinize or react to the individual conduct of the directors of 
such companies who had actually committed the prohibited conduct in question, as a result, 
individuals actually responsible were able to escape liability.23 However, one should bear in 
mind the simple fact that companies act through their directors, who have fiduciary duties to 
act in the best interests of the company and yet these duties have not deterred directors from 
                                                          
18 Ngobese, C ‘NUMSA: dismiss all Directors’ and CEOs’ available at http://www.numsa.org.za/article/numsa-
dismiss-all-directors-and-ceos-2013-06-25/, accessed on 28 February 2014. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Shahim, C (2013) ‘Colluding Constructions: Lucky break?’ available at 




23 Lopes, N; Seth, J; Gauntlett, E  ‘Cartel enforcement, the CLP and criminal liability – are competition regulators 
hamstrung by the Competition Act from co-operating with the NPA, and is this a problem for competition 
law enforcement?’ available at www.compcom.co.za/.../Cartel-Enforcement-Paper-Final-2013-08-20.pdf, 
accessed on 24 March 2014. 
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engaging in prohibited conduct, such as being part of a cartel and participating in tender 
collusion.24 
 
The time has come for directors to be held accountable for their actions as a consequence of 
involving their companies in cartel conduct. Cognizance should be given to the fact that ‘but 
for’ the cartel conduct of the director in question, their companies would never have had to 
sustain the large civil fines that they are being condemned with as a result thereof. It is 
therefore submitted that a criminal liability provision in the Competition Act would offer an 
ideal mechanism to protect companies and manage cartel activities. Whether such 
prosecutions are suitable under the umbrella of criminal law, competition law or company 
law remains a contentious point and one that this dissertation seeks to evaluate. It would 
appear that the statutes governing this area of law, in their current form, present practical 
concerns which would need to be remedied in order to provide an effective solution to the 
problem of cartel conduct. 
 
‘Unlike the entrenched principles of Company Law that do not attach personal criminal 
liability to the conduct of directors, acting within their capacities as directors’25 for specific 
public interest crimes such as the cartel offence of tender collusion, competition law at the 
very least should pierce the corporate veil and punish directors involved.26 Directors who 
participate in tender collusion should face criminal penalties for doing so.27 Therefore a 
provision imposing criminal liability onto such directors may prove to be an indispensable 
tool in securing justice. 
 
Currently, ‘South African competition law does not make provision for personal liability.’28 
However competition authorities in a number of countries have steered towards the 
introduction of criminal sanctions against the individuals involved in cartel activities, in an 
effort to advance the fight against cartel conduct. It is, however, feared that subjecting 
individuals to personal criminal liability in South Africa will entangle competition authorities 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Monnye, SL & Afrika, S ‘Prison beckons directors involved in cartels’ (2008) 16(1) Juta’s Business Law 13. 
26 Monnye (note 25 above) 14. 
27 Monnye (note 25 above) 14. 
28 Shahim, C (2013) ‘Colluding Constructions: Lucky break?’ available at 




in pointless litigation thereby requiring ‘them to work much harder to detect and prosecute 
cartels in future.’29 
 
Notwithstanding constitutional and policy concerns relating to the effective imposition of 
criminal and civil sanctions on individuals, despite strident objections from practitioners, 
businesses and other stakeholders, parliament introduced a provision in the Competition 
Amendment Act 1 of 2009 (‘the Competition Amendment Act’) that creates a ‘cartel offence’ 
by criminalising cartel activity. This provision followed the implementation of a similar 
provision in other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia.30 
The Competition Amendment Act was promulgated in 200931 but is currently only partially 
enforced. Thus certain amendments have not yet become effective and of particular 
significance is the insertion of section 73A. Section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act 
inserts section 73A into the original Competition Act.  
 
From the outset, it is important to note that this dissertation will only place focus on directors’ 
criminal liability and not that of persons of those involved in the management of the 
company. Section 73A ‘introduces criminal sanctions for infringements of section 4(1)(b) of 
the Competition Act by directors, or persons occupying management positions, within a 
firm.’32 Therefore under section 73A, cartel conduct will become a criminal offence in South 
Africa. It is apparent that once the Competition Amendment Act comes into full force, it will 
undoubtedly constitute the most significant overhaul in South African competition law to 
date.33  
 
The relevant section provides for the imposition of personal criminal liability on company 
directors or persons engaged by firms in positions having management authority, in an effort 
to manage cartel activities. Section 73A therefore criminalises cartel conduct and establishes, 
as has been termed in other countries, a ‘cartel offence’.34 The offence is committed if a 
director within the firm causes that firm to engage in a prohibited practice or knowingly 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Kelly, L ‘Introduction of a ‘Cartel Offence’ into South African Law’ (2010) 21(2) Stellenbosch Law Review = 
Stellenbosch Regstydskrif 321-333. 
32 Shahim, C (2013) ‘Colluding Constructions: Lucky break?’ available at 






acquiesces in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the 
Competition Act.35 Section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act deals with ‘Causing or 
permitting firm to engage in prohibited practice’ provides that: 
‘(1) A person commits an offence if, while being a director of a firm or while engaged or 
purporting to be engaged by a firm in a position having management authority within the firm, 
such person— 
(a) caused the firm to engage in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b); or 
(b) knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in terms of 
section 4(1)(b). 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1)(b), ‘knowingly acquiesced’ means having acquiesced 
while having actual knowledge of the relevant conduct by the firm. 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a person may be prosecuted for an offence in terms of this 
section only if— 
(a) the relevant firm has acknowledged, in a consent order contemplated in section 49D, 
that it engaged in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b); or 
(b) the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court has made a finding that 
the relevant firm engaged in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b). 
(4) The Competition Commission— 
(a) may not seek or request the prosecution of a person for an offence in terms of this 
section if the Competition Commission has certified that the person is deserving of 
leniency in the circumstances; and 
(b) may make submissions to the National Prosecuting Authority in support of leniency 
for any person prosecuted for an offence in terms of this section, if the Competition 
Commission has certified that the person is deserving of leniency in the circumstances. 
(5) In any court proceedings against a person in terms of this section, an acknowledgement in 
a consent order contemplated in section 49D by the firm or a finding by the Competition 
Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court that the firm has engaged in a prohibited practice 
in terms of section 4(1)(b), is prima facie proof of the fact that the firm engaged in that 
conduct. 
(6) A firm may not directly or indirectly— 
(a) pay any fine that may be imposed on a person convicted of an offence in terms of this 
section; or 
(b) indemnify, reimburse, compensate or otherwise defray the expenses of a person 
incurred in defending against a prosecution in terms of this section, unless the 
prosecution is abandoned or the person is acquitted.’36 
                                                          
35 Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. 
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It is inevitable that the enforcement of criminal sanctions in a previously civil arena is bound 
to raise concerns amongst directors anxious that their conduct may fall under section 73A. 
The section has raised a number of serious questions and has given rise to widespread debates 
concerning its efficient enforcement, the Corporate Leniency Policy (the ‘CLP’), coordination 
issues and constitutional issues regarding an accused director’s constitutional rights to a fair 
trial in general.37There also exists the very real possibility that the threat of criminal 
prosecution will negatively impact upon the CLP that is so central to the detection of 
sophisticated tender colluding cartels38. 
 
Section 73A involves the National Prosecuting Authority (‘NPA’) in the enforcement of its 
provisions; however the NPA’s resources and expertise may be insufficient to deal with 
competition law violations. Furthermore, no framework is provided for the NPA’s 
coordination with the Competition Commission. Also problematic in this regard is the fact 
that the final decision to prosecute an individual is taken by the NPA, ‘even if the 
Competition Commission finds that the offender is deserving of leniency.’39 This creates 
uncertainty as to the extent of coordination required between the NPA and the Competition 
Commission which might be detrimental to the South African CLP. 
 
Cartel conduct is commonly ‘considered to be the most egregious form of anti-competitive 
behaviour’40 and thus there exists a need for an effective enforcement policy. This policy 
must be capable of both reducing the incentive for parties to collude by imposing serious 
penalties for those involved, whilst also creating attractive incentives for those involved to 
disclose their involvement in cartel conduct to competition authorities.41 The Competition 
Commission’s ‘applied weapon of choice in combating the deleterious effect of cartel 
conduct in South Africa’ is the CLP.42 The CLP operates to protect or grant immunity from 
prosecution by competition authorities to companies which are the first to disclose cartel 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
36 Ibid. 
37 Kelly (note 31 above) 322. 
38 Lopes, N; Seth, J; Gauntlett, E  ‘Cartel enforcement, the CLP and criminal liability – are competition regulators 
hamstrung by the Competition Act from co-operating with the NPA, and is this a problem for competition 
law enforcement?’ available at www.compcom.co.za/.../Cartel-Enforcement-Paper-Final-2013-08-20.pdf, 
accessed on 24 March 2014. 
39 Markus Merdian The Criminalisation of Cartel Conduct in South Africa and the United Kingdom (unpublished 






behaviour. The competition authorities use the information acquired from such companies to 
effectively expose and eliminate the cartel arrangement in question.43 However such 
immunity does not extend to various parallel offences engaged in by individuals employed by 
such companies.44 
 
Some may argue that ‘the introduction of criminal liability to individual cartel members in 
Section 73A (3) and (4) of the Competition Amendment Act should be welcomed with both 
hands as it common cause that most cartel activities are done deliberately by the individuals 
who know its effects on consumers, economic development and the market.’45  Others argue 
that a finding that a firm has engaged in a prohibited practice leads to an unfair presumption 
or reverse burden of proof against the director or manager in subsequent criminal proceedings 
against him under section 73A(5). It may further be contended that the presumption relates 
only to the conduct of the firm and not to that of an individual director. The constitutional 
concerns that have been raised by various observers regarding section 73A are ‘born out of 
genuine and legitimate fears that directors’ fundamental rights may be trampled upon.’46  
More particularly, the rights possibly infringed by the section 73A provision would be the 
director’s right ‘to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the 
proceedings’ and the broader right to a fair trial in general.’47 While others may be of the 
view that criminal sanctions are not justified in the context of corporate cartels and that large 
fines ought to be enough to compensate victims of tender collusion and pacify authorities’ 
determined on deterring future tender collusion.48 However, the law needs to find a balance 
between holding the individual responsible and the company involved criminally, or civilly 





                                                          
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Makhubele (note 4 above) 21. 
46 Jordaan, L & Munyai, PS ‘The Constitutional Implications of the New Section 73A of the Competition Act 89 
of 1998’ (2011) 23(2) SA Mercantile Law Journal = SA Tydskrif vir Handelsreg 197 – 213. 





1.2 Problem Statement 
 
In light of the recent debates regarding the impact of cartels on the South African economy, 
the prevention of their formation, detection of their existence and punishment thereof remains 
an important task for competition authorities in South Africa. This dissertation examines 
whether individuals involved in cartel conduct can or should be held accountable and 
personally liable. In analysing the extent of the imposition of personal liability in competition 
law, it will show how South Africa has dealt with the task of introducing criminal sanctions in 
competition law for individuals, specifically directors, engaging in cartel conduct. It will 
provide an enquiry into the effectiveness of the cartel offence created under section 73A of 
the Competition Amendment Act which is yet to be enforced in South Africa. 
 
The challenge arises where a corporate body is fined for anti-competitive behaviour for 
engaging in cartel activities such as tender collusion, i.e.: a corporate crime. The legal 
question that may then arise is whether it is more advantageous to punish the company or the 
individual responsible for engaging in anti-competitive conduct given the fact that a 
company’s actions are executed by its directors and employees on its behalf.  In the event that 
it is more advantageous to punish the individual, can or should the individuals involved be 
held personally liable. Further, if this is so, is it then possible for the offending companies to 
take action against executives/directors or former executives/directors to recover damages or 
recoup the delictual loss suffered by the company financially. It should be noted that the 
problem becomes increasingly difficult where none of these executives/directors or former 
executives/directors (as they have since resigned to escape liability) have been found guilty of 
a crime in any court of law or any disciplinary process and are therefore absolved from 
liability. The legal conundrum would then be to determine which branch of law would be 
better suited to deal with such a situation given the complexity of the matter. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse the liability imposed on South African 
companies for the cartel offence of tender collusion and the offending company’s rights to 
hold its directors personally criminally and civilly accountable in accordance with specific 
statutory provisions. It will evaluate the circumstances under which a company that has been 
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fined or faces being fined for tender collusion will be able to recover damages or recoup the 
loss suffered by the company in the form of substantial fines paid from directors or former 
directors. It will also evaluate the legal action that may be taken by NPA and the Competition 
Commission to prosecute such individuals. 
 
Furthermore, the purpose of this dissertation is to enlighten directors engaging in cartel 
conduct of their responsibilities towards the company; the consequences of their actions as 
well as alert offending companies of the action that could be taken against such directors in 
terms of the law. This dissertation therefore aims to provide a benchmark on the liability of 
directors for cartel offences such as tender collusion. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology adopted is the ‘black letter’ or desk top research methodology 
which is a traditionalist approach that concentrates on the ‘letter of the law’. This study is 
therefore a literature study. This means that existing resources on the subject will be used, 
through which an opinion will be formed. The scope of the research falls within South 
African law. The research methodology involves a study of the law by providing a descriptive 
analysis of a large number of legal rules to be found in primary sources such as statutes and 
case law. This type of methodology also requires searching for and examining information 
using existing academic secondary sources, such as journal and newspaper articles, the online 
resources and investigative reports which will then be followed by cross referencing and 
collation of the information collected.  
 
1.4.1 Chapter Breakdown 
 
Chapter one of the dissertation is aimed at introducing the reader to the core concepts of 
what corporate crime is and how the cartel offence of tender collusion fits into that definition. 
This discussion will also provide the statutory provisions in legislation pertaining to these 
concepts and how they have been interpreted in their present form. 
 
Chapter two focuses on defining key concepts, it analyses the statutory laws regarding 
restrictive horizontal practices and how the concept of tender collusion is derived from that 
those practices. It will further discuss the causes and consequences of tender collusion. The 
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chapter also tracks the historical context of competition law and the development of 
Parliaments’ approach to dealing with and regulating tender collusion. It will evaluate 
whether criminal law sanctions are necessary in competition law to and provide arguments in 
favour of the introduction of criminal liability as a legal mechanism aimed at deterring cartel 
conduct whilst considering the potential impact such sanctions may have. 
 
Chapter three of this dissertation will focus on the relationship between competition law and 
criminal law, the Competition Amendment Act and its purpose in terms of the codification of 
the CLP and the development of section 73A. In analysing the extent of the imposition of 
personal criminal liability in competition law and criminal law, it will consider the effects that 
such punitive provisions will have on the successful implementation of the CLP advanced by 
the Competition Commission.  In doing so, section 73A in its present form will be 
specifically analysed by highlighting certain weaknesses inherent in its approach to 
criminalisation that may negatively impact on enforcement, as well as noting certain aspects 
of the section that may present difficulties for the authorities in securing convictions.  
 
Chapter four of this dissertation looks at the imposition of liability for cartel conduct. It 
considers liability on the part of the company and its director’s under company law, 
competition law and criminal law. It assesses the sanctions that may be imposed, the possible 
defences that may be raised. It will also look at recent developments in South African 
competition law regarding tender collusion. 
 
The last chapter of this dissertation will provide a conclusion as to whether the introduction 
of criminal sanctions for cartel offences such as tender collusion is necessary, and whether 
criminal sanctions against individuals are appropriate in the context of competition law. 
 
1.5 Anticipated Limitations 
 
One of the aims of this dissertation is to focus on the imposition of criminal liability on 
directors for the cartel offence of tender collusion which is a corporate crime.  
 
Section 1 of the Competition Act does not define what a ‘prohibited practice’ is however 
chapter 2 of the Competition Act deals with ‘prohibited practices’. Chapter 2 merely 
describes anti-competitive conduct as a ‘prohibited practice’. Generally, prohibited practices 
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are those types of conduct which the Competition Act prohibits because they have, or may 
have anti-competitive effects on the economy or are the product of improper uses of market 
power. This part of the Competition Act does not attempt to address anti-competitive market 
structures directly, although market structure may be relevant in determining whether conduct 
is to be condemned. Chapter 2 prohibits three types of conduct, namely vertical restrictive 
practices, horizontal restrictive practices and abuses of dominance.   
 
Cartel activity is a restrictive horizontal practice which is prohibited by section 4(1)(b) and in 
terms of sub-section (iii) includes collusive tendering. Thus this dissertation will be based on 
the assumption that the cartel offence of tender collusion is a restrictive horizontal practice 
and is therefore classified as a prohibited practice.  
 
Although section 73A provides for the imposition of personal criminal liability on company 
directors or persons employed by firms occupying positions of management authority for 
causing or permitting firms to engage in practices that are prohibited under section 4(1)(b) of 
the Competition Act,  this dissertation will focus on the imposition of personal criminal 
liability on company directors to the exclusion of persons employed by firms occupying 






















In order to understand the context in which tender collusion operates as a cartel offence, as 
well as a punishable corporate crime within the Competition Act, an understanding of what 
constitutes tender collusion is imperative. This chapter traces the historical context in which 
tender collusion operates in South Africa and its prevalence in our economy. In addition, the 
chapter analyses the development of parliament’s approach in dealing with and regulating 
anti-competitive conduct in relation to the amendments of the Competition Act.  
 
2.2 What is a Cartel? 
 
‘A cartel refers to an association of competing firms which have agreements on a horizontal 
level to engage in certain conduct like price fixing, division or allocation of markets and 
collusive tendering.’49 In this instance, a horizontal agreement is simply an agreement 
between two or more competitors operating at the same level of the market.50 In terms of 
these agreements, firms are obliged to cooperate with one another in order to ensure the 
success of the cartel. The degree of cooperation required between these firms may vary 
according to the type of industry.51  
 
Essentially, a cartel exists when companies or businesses agree to work together rather than 
competing against one another in the market.52 This agreement is designed to increase profits 
of cartel participants while maintaining the impression of competition in the market place. 
Cartels control the markets and restrict choices. Such cartels have the ability to put honest, 
well-run and productive companies out of business while stifling innovation and protecting its 
own incompetent members.53  
 
                                                          
49 Markus Merdian The Criminalisation of Cartel Conduct in South Africa and the United Kingdom (unpublished 
LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013). 
50 Section 1 of Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
51 Markus Merdian The Criminalisation of Cartel Conduct in South Africa and the United Kingdom (unpublished 





These agreements may be advantageous to the economy where firms decide to launch a new 
innovative product, share profits and losses or pass on savings to the public.54 But where the 
purpose of cooperation is to maximise profit for participants at the expense of consumers, 
such an agreement may be highly detrimental to the economy and have far reaching effects.55 
Such horizontal collusion is generally known in competition law as ‘cartel conduct’.56 
 
2.3 What is Tender Collusion? 
 
The practice of tender collusion is present in the South African economy. This view is 
supported by the increase in the number of cartel cases that the Competition Commission has 
recently had to tackle, particularly within the construction industry.57 The term ‘cartel’ refers 
to an association by agreement among competing firms to engage in prohibited practices such 
as collusive tendering.58 Section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act prohibits cartel activity. The 
section lists anti-competitive practices which are often termed as ‘hard-core’59 restrictions of 
competition and defines the term ‘cartel offence’ to include the restrictive horizontal practice 
of collusive tendering. 
 
Collusive tendering is commonly referred to as ‘bid rigging’ and refers to agreements that are 
entered into by ‘competitors not to compete on the bids they submit after being invited to 
tender.’60 To this end, firms will be regarded as competitors if they are involved in carrying 
on a similar business. Collusive tendering falls within the class of anti-competitive conduct 
referred to as ‘cartel activity’, together with market allocation and price fixing.61 
 
Section 4(1)(b)(iii) of the Competition Act prohibits all forms of collusive tendering. 62 There 
are various forms of collusive tendering that one should be aware of, for example, bid rotation 




57 Khumalo, J, Nqojela, P, Njisane, Y ‘Cover pricing in the construction industry: understanding the practice 
within a competition context’ available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fourth-
Competition-Law-Conferece/Session-1A/Cover-pricing-in-the-construction-industry-Final.pdf, accessed on 25 
June 2014. 
58 Monnye (note 25 above) 15. 
59 Kelly (note 31 above) 325. 
60 GUIDELINES FOR FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT – OECD available at 





occurs when a number of firms decide to submit high bids so that a prearranged bidder will 
succeed in procuring the bid.63 Bid suppression, on the other hand, occurs where firms agree 
to refrain from bidding, whereas complementary bidding occurs ‘where firms agree on their 
bids in advance by deciding that one of them will submit the lowest bid or will submit the 
only bid containing acceptable terms.’64 Collusive tendering is often accompanied by an 
agreement, between colluding competitors, to allocate portions of a tender to the losing bidder 
should the tenders not be awarded as had been envisaged by the firms involved.65 
 
2.3.1 The causes of tender collusion 
 
Tendering procedures are designed to create competition in sectors of the economy where this 
might otherwise be absent.66 An important characteristic of this system is the independent 
preparation and submission of tenders by potential suppliers.67 Collusive tendering 
undermines this system. Tender collusion is a process whereby competitors conspire together 
in an effort to effectively raise the prices of goods or services in demand through the 
solicitation of competing tenders.68 The common objective of any type of collusive tendering 
scheme is to raise the amount of the winning tender and ultimately the amount that the 
winning bidder will gain.69 This scheme requires that there be an agreement between 
competitors in advance as to who will submit the winning bid for a particular tender 
contract.70 Generally, firms engage in cartel activities, such as tender collusion, to maximise 
the joint profits of cartel members by operating as a collective unit as if they were a 
monopoly.71 
 
                                                          
63 Ibid. 
64 Lopes, N; Seth, J; Gauntlett, E ‘Cartel enforcement, the CLP and criminal liability – are competition regulators 
hamstrung by the Competition Act from co-operating with the NPA, and is this problem for competition law 
enforcement?’ available at www.compcom.co.za/.../Cartel-Enforcement-Paper-Final-2013-08-20.pdf, 
accessed on 24 March 2014. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Khumalo, J, Nqojela, P, Njisane, Y ‘Cover pricing in the construction industry: understanding the practice 
within a competition context’ available at                        
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Fourth-Competition-Law-Conferece/Session-1A/Cover-
pricing-in-the-construction-industry-Final.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2014. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 GUIDELINES FOR FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT – OECD available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42851044.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2014. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Makhubele (note 4 above) 22. 
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2.3.2 The consequences of tender collusion 
 
Collusive tendering reduces competition among firms that are competing for business in a 
free market.72 This limits innovation and deprives consumers of lower prices or better goods 
or services.73 It should be noted that when competitors agree to forgo competition for 
collusion, consumers are disadvantaged, as they lose benefits that should have been afforded 
to them.  
 
For an economy to thrive, the market requires an efficient competitive process in which 
competitors set prices or bid for tenders independently of one another.74  South Africa’s 
economy, whilst subject to governmental control is driven by a free market system and 
competition within that free market. Consumers should therefore be entitled to a choice of 
competitive prices and products. The cartel offence of tender collusion diminishes this right 
in that it: destroys the basis of a competitive economy; stifles fiscal development; and hinders 
innovation. This often leads to increased prices or reduced quality, and is harmful to the 
overall welfare of consumers. Competition thereby assists in securing the fair treatment of 
consumers by ensuring that they receive value for money. Therefore, the early detection and 
enforcement of preventive measures curtail cartel activity. This assists to stabilise the 
economy and prevent consumers from falling victim to artificially high prices and reduced 
quality.75  
 
Cartel conduct by a firm is punishable by an administrative penalty that may not exceed 10 
percent of the firm’s annual turnover in South Africa and its exports from South Africa during 
the firm’s preceding financial year.76 The very nature of cartel activity undermines economic 
development and fair competition in the economy.77 
 
 
                                                          
72 Monnye (note 25 above) 16. 
73 Monnye (note 25 above) 16. 
74 Monnye (note 25 above) 17. 
75 GUIDELINES FOR FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT – OECD available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42851044.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2014. 
76 Section 59(2) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
77 Monnye (note 25 above) 17. 
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2.4 The development of Parliaments’ approach to regulating and dealing with Tender 
Collusion 
 
In order to fundamentally understand the legislative framework in which the new provisions 
relating to cartel behaviour operate to hold those responsible for cartel conduct accountable, it 
is of paramount importance to briefly set out the purpose and objectives of the Competition 
Act in as far as they are applicable. 
 
2.4.1 The purpose of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 in the new constitutional era 
 
The primary goal of the Competition Act is the promotion and maintenance of competition. 
As such, the Competition Tribunal interprets the law to achieve this goal. One of the most 
common and egregious contraventions of the substantive provisions of the Competition Act 
are clearly the prohibited practices referred to in Chapter 2 of the Competition Act. 
 
The Competition Act was promulgated to promote and maintain competition in the South 
African economy in the aftermath of apartheid.78 Various markets in the South African 
economy have historically been characterised by monopolies, high levels of economic 
concentration and restrictive economic policies.79 A number of powerful monopolies operated 
in the past which effectively controlled the majority of the South African economy. The 
apartheid regime created economic isolation, during which many of these monopolies were 
the beneficiaries of state concessions.80 Thus for a new constitutional dispensation to arise, 
free trade had to be embraced together with the adoption of a new competition policy81 which 
would be capable of fostering economic development through fair competition between 
commercial rivals, whilst seeking to redress the economic inequalities of the past. 
 
Previously, cartels formed by major stakeholders and industry leaders were a common feature 
of the South African economy.82 Accordingly, the administrative penalty provisions of the 
                                                          
78 Jordaan (note 46 above) 198. 
79 Jordaan (note 46 above) 198. 
80 Lopes, N; Seth, J; Gauntlett, E ‘Cartel enforcement, the CLP and criminal liability – are competition regulators 
hamstrung by the Competition Act from co-operating with the NPA, and is this problem for competition law 
enforcement?’ available at www.compcom.co.za/.../Cartel-Enforcement-Paper-Final-2013-08-20.pdf, 
accessed on 24 March 2014. 




Competition Act were designed to suit a corporate type of offender.83 The administrative 
penalty provisions of 10 percent of annual turnover were considered to be an effective 
method aimed at not only punishing but also deterring firms from engaging in prohibited 
practices.84 Inherently contained in these penal provisions was the tacit acknowledgement that 
the Competition Act was principally concerned with the monetary penalisation of firms for 
derogation from its provisions, rather than seeking to act directly against those individual 
directors of that firm who were allegedly responsible for anti-competitive behaviour.85 The 
Competition Act was thus a quasi-civil piece of legislation.86 It was intended to achieve broad 
socio-economic objectives, rather than individualised criminal prosecution of company 
directors for being involved in corporate criminal conduct and more specifically, prohibited 
practices. 
 
It could further be evidenced that at the time of the drafting of the Competition Act87, the 
formulation of mechanisms to deter and eradicate anti-competitive practices, so as to allow 
for open, efficient and competitive markets to be developed, was a far greater policy objective 
than the criminal prosecution of the individuals within the corporate bodies who actually 
committed the crimes. Thus the penal or deterrence measures envisaged by the drafters of the 
Competition Act88 for contraventions of its substantive provisions, applied exclusively to 
firms or the corporate entity i.e. the juristic persons, and not to natural persons associated 
with those firms such as directors, who ultimately controlled the activities of the firm. 
 
It is possible that the drafters of the Competition Act might have considered the legal 
implications of the distinction that exists between a company and its members. The notion is 
that a company is a separate legal entity, and as such its individual members may only be held 
liable for acts performed by the company in exceptional circumstances.89 
 
                                                          
83 Ibid. 
84 Kelly (note 31 above) 326. 
85 Lopes, N; Seth, J; Gauntlett, E ‘Cartel enforcement, the CLP and criminal liability – are competition regulators 
hamstrung by the Competition Act from co-operating with the NPA, and is this problem for competition law 
enforcement?’ available at www.compcom.co.za/.../Cartel-Enforcement-Paper-Final-2013-08-20.pdf, 
accessed on 24 March 2014. 
86 Jordaan (note 46 above) 198. 
87 89 of 1998. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Jordaan (note 46 above) 198. 
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It is against this backdrop that section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act inserts section 
73A into the original Competition Act. The section provides for the imposition of personal 
criminal liability on company directors or persons employed by firms occupying positions of 
management authority for causing or permitting firms to engage in practices that are 
prohibited under section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. As mentioned above, it is important 
to note that this dissertation will focus solely on the criminal liability of company directors to 
the exclusion of other persons engaged by firms in positions of management authority.  
 
2.5 The Introduction of Criminal Law Sanctions in Competition Law 
 
The introduction and enforcement of criminal law sanctions in the context of competition 
law, an erstwhile civil arena, is undoubtedly controversial. Those against this introduction 
would argue that there is no justification for criminal law sanctions to be imposed on 
corporate cartels as large fines serve to deter future cartel activities, while those in favour 
argue otherwise. However the reality remains that there ‘exists a very real possibility that the 
threat of criminal prosecution will negatively impact upon the CLP that is so central to the 
detection of sophisticated cartels’.90 Considering its constitutional implications, the 
challenges faced in criminalising competition law and more specifically cartel conduct, were 
inevitable from the outset of the Competition Amendment Act.  
 
Whilst the Competition Amendment Act may seem like a bold step towards deterring anti-
competitive practices that are prevalent in the South African economy, it remains a necessary 
tool in ensuring that companies found to have been involved in prohibited practices are not 
only heavily fined, but that their directors are also held accountable for their participation in 
such conduct. However, this has consequently led to an array of discussions amongst 
concerned directors who fear that their conduct may fall under section 73A, thus having a 
potentially alarming effect on corporate conduct that is actually benign.91 The law therefore 
needs to strike a balance between punishing cartel behaviour and protecting innocent 
directors who are exercising their reasonable commercial judgment, from unnecessary 
litigation and harassment. The arguments as to whether such sanctions are necessary in a 
competition law arena will be addressed below. 
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2.5.1 Are criminal sanctions necessary in Competiton Law? 
 
Hypothetical perfect market systems are undermined by monopolies, thus without the 
existence of competitive restraints, monopolies would be free to price at a profit maximising 
point and consumers would be forced to tolerate this.92  
 
‘The central purpose of competition law is the protection and promotion of a competitive 
market economy. In competitive markets, firms prosper (and indeed survive) by surpassing 
their rivals in identifying and serving consumer needs, with the result that resources are put to 
their best use leading to the provision of an appropriate amount of goods or services 
(allocative efficiency) at the lowest cost (productive efficiency).’93 
 
In this regard, a cartel may be equated to a monopoly as it attempts to achieve the same 
degree of market power as a monopoly would through practical cooperation and participation 
between members. In respect of cartels, ‘through cooperation firms reduce uncertainty in the 
market, one of the key drivers of rivalry’94 which undermines the entire notion of competition 
in the economy. Cartels have the same adverse economic effects as monopolies, i.e. higher 
prices, limited choices and little innovation.95 Courts have historically been known to morally 
consider the position of those who are most vulnerable in the economy and those who are 
adversely affected or impacted by the consequences of the apprehension of a firm, namely its 
employees and shareholders. This arguably strengthens the moral imperative for deterrence 
and punishment.96 
 
Companies guilty of participating in cartel conduct are fined up to 10 percent of their annual 
turnover in terms of the present Competition Act. The legislature has created provisions 
which have the potential for substantial fines to be levied on offending companies. The 
question can then be raised as to why parliament has seen it fit to criminalise cartel conduct in 
competition law?97 
 
                                                          
92 Jordaan (note 46 above) 199. 
93 Kelly (note 31 above) 328. 
94 Kelly (note 31 above) 328. 
95 Kelly (note 31 above) 328. 
96 Kelly (note 31 above) 329. 
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A possible answer to the above question could be that it becomes problematic to place an 
over reliance on fines to enforce regulatory offences involving companies. Section 59(4) of 
the Competition Act provides that monies collected as a result of levying of fines are paid to 
the National Treasury and forms part of the national budget. The fines levied go towards 
reducing the overall tax burden on the country.98 In some instances the fines levied merely 
form part of the company’s expenses or cost of trading and are likely to be recovered by the 
company through trade in the form of increased prices for goods or services.99  
 
Moreover, in instances where the profitability of the cartel proves to be highly beneficial to 
those involved that a simple cost-benefit analysis, which assesses likelihood of detection and 
punishment, potential legal fees and a possible fine of up to 10 percent annual turnover, may 
be insufficient to deter those in control of such  a cartel.100 In such instances, the benefits may 
outweigh the punishment. 
 
Even though competition authorities have been given the discretion in law to vary the amount 
of the fine imposed on an offending company, situations may arise where a cartel member (in 
this instance member refers to the company as a whole) is fined and as a result, has to 
downscale or shut down altogether. There are several negative consequences in such a 
situation as employees of the offending company may be retrenched, shareholders may lose 
their investments or the company may choose to exit the market, thereby affecting the 
economy and potential tax revenues may be lost. 
 
Competition laws are regulatory in nature and are therefore manifestations of state policy 
which ‘indicate the willingness of the state to intervene in economic and social activities’.101 
Directors are considered to be those individuals who have the potential to involve firms under 
their control in cartel activities. Directors involved in prohibited practices often carry out a 
cost-benefit analysis to work out whether the benefits of involving their firms in cartel 
activity outweigh the potential legal costs that they may incur if they are found to have 
contravened the law. It is likely that these directors would be hesitant to disclose the benefits 
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101 Rosochowicz ‘The Appropriateness of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Competition Law’ 2004 ECLR 
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thereof when, after performing a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits outweigh the costs. Such 
costs may involve that director facing criminal prosecution and/or a substantial personal fine, 
along with the public scrutiny that often accompanies high-profile corporate scandals.102  
 
On the other hand, if competition authorities effectively enforce the legislation, the inclusion 
of criminal sanctions in a competition law arena will considerably raise the variable of cost in 
an overall cost-benefit analysis.103 It therefore follows that in order for new sanctions to have 
real deterrence value, there would need to be successful prosecutions of individuals 
controlling cartels under the Competition Act. However, the challenge faced by parliament is 
to implement a thorough and nuanced framework for criminal sanctions within competition 
law which compliments and integrates with the existing mechanisms to combat cartels 
without infringing on the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 104 Unfortunately, for 
corporations and their directors, the Competition Amendment Act and in particular its 
insertion of section 73A into the principal Act, falls short in this aspect, given the various 
concerns it gives rise to, as documented above. 
 
It may also be appropriate to consider whether the imposition of criminal sanctions against 
directors is a justifiable way to hold directors personally accountable. In order to assess this, 
one would have to explore whether or not there exists a less restrictive means of achieving the 
same objective. A possible option might be the disqualification of a director from holding a 
managerial position or company directorship for a certain period of time.105 The remedy for 
director disqualification is available under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Companies 
Act’). Section 162 of the Companies Act provides that certain types of conduct of directors 
may render a director to be declared delinquent. In terms of the Act, a director who has been 
declared delinquent is disqualified from holding the position of director.106 
 
Although the remedy of disqualification of delinquent directors may be regarded as a less 
intrusive and, to some extent a progressive means, its weakness in South African competition 
law is that it might be insufficient and ineffective in itself to adequately deal with the 
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prevalent scourge of cartels, especially in key sectors of the economy.107 The vast majority of 
South Africans, against whom cartel conduct strikes at the very core of their livelihood, are 
very poor. Wealthy nations such as Britain, which boasts a significant number of high net-
worth individuals and families compared to South Africa, have opted to use the remedy of 
director disqualification in tandem with criminal sanctions. Given the social and economic 
implications of cartels in South Africa, it is submitted that the introduction of criminal 
sanctions is highly suitable.108 
 
2.5.2 Arguments in favour of the introduction of Criminal Law sanctions in Competition 
Law 
 
The decisions taken by directors to act in breach of competition laws are often based on a 
cost-benefit analysis.109 In some instances the scandalous monetary incentives directors 
receive play an important role in swaying their decision of whether or not their firms should 
abide by competition laws. Directors may engage in cartel conduct whilst striving to 
maximise profit objectives, given the attractive incentives that are offered to them, including 
‘personal monetary gain, status, expensive business trips, lush company cars and dinners as 
well as discretionary powers over decision making for which the company incurs the 
unnecessary costs’.110 In these instances, corporate penalties, such as administrative fines, do 
not constitute an appropriate sanction capable of deterring potential offenders. The reason for 
this is that it is the individuals within the corporation who make the decision to engage in 
cartel conduct and hence actually commit the corporate crime.111 
 
In order to prevent a situation where company liability acts as a shield behind which directors 
can hide and collude to their personal advantage or own benefit, the corporate veil needs to be 
lifted. Direct intervention from the authorities against the individuals responsible is needed, in 
the form of individual fines, disqualification orders or jail sentences, as these sanctions 
provide a more effective tool towards deterring anti-competitive practices prevalent in the 
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South African economy.112 By targeting the actual decision maker (whether that be the 
director or any other individual) within the firm and not the firm as a whole, competition 
authorities will avoid ineffective corporate governance mechanisms of compliance and 
indirect punishment.113  This process would help draw out the individual offenders out of the 
economy by identifying and naming them.114 Such actions would serve as precautionary 
measures to avoid future violations of competition law by warning potential employers of 
such offenders, whilst also creating an effective means of punishment to deter such anti-
competitive conduct.  
 
This process is commonly known as the common law remedy of ‘piercing the corporate 
veil'.115 The remedy allows an aggrieved party to obtain an order declaring that the rights, 
liabilities or activities of a company ought to be treated as those of the relevant shareholder or 
director in his personal capacity.116 It is usually applied in circumstances where there has 
been some impropriety linked to an abuse of the company's legal personality. According to 
Davis the court will pierce the corporate veil where a company is used as a device to cover up 
or disguise fraudulent or illegal conduct; where a director and / or shareholder treats the 
company’s assets as his or her own; or when a statute empowers the court to ignore corporate 
legal personality.117 The Western Cape High Court in the decision of Ex parte Gore NNO118  
dealt with the interpretation of section 20(9) of the Companies Act which specifically permits 
piercing of the corporate veil in certain circumstances. The court held that the remedy is 
available 'whenever the illegitimate use of the concept of juristic personality adversely affects 
a third party in a way that reasonably should not be countenanced'.119 It was further decided 
that the remedy could be used in a variety of circumstances as a remedy of first instance, and 
not as a last resort in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done.120  
 
However the Competition Amendment Act, with particular reference to section 73A, creates a 
very real possibility that the threat of criminal prosecution will negatively impact and weaken 
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the effectiveness of the CLP and a firm’s incentive to enter into consent orders, which are two 
important mechanisms central to the detection of sophisticated cartels.121  
 
Various scholars have argued that for the efficient enforcement of cartel law, the use of 
criminal sanctions is necessary. These arguments are motivated by the fact that cartel 
operations involve price-fixing, market allocation and/or bid rigging, all of which have 
harmful effects on consumers and the competitive processes that are necessary for economic 
growth. It is said that cartel conduct may be likened to a ‘sophisticated form of theft involving 
the deceitful acquisition of wealth that rightly belongs to the consumer’.122 
 
Moreover, if competition authorities could create a clear and targeted form of intervention 
which separates the directors responsible from owners and employees with no involvement in 
the anti-competitive acts, individual sanctions could be proficiently paired with the CLP and 
other compliance programmes. Criminal prosecution of individuals personally responsible 
would bring violations of competition law to the public conscience as a serious form of white 
collar crime. Furthermore, raising awareness of the fact that anti-competitive behaviour 
negatively affects the economy and society at large is likely to reduce violations generally. 
 
The consequences of cartel conduct have been well documented in chapter 2. It is submitted 
further that with regard to the far reaching effects of cartel conduct, cartel activity results in a 
sufficient degree of harm to the economy to be considered for criminalisation. While there 
has been unanimity by competition authorities and anti-trust scholars surrounding the 
damaging consequences of cartel conduct, there has historically been a significant divergence 
in the remedies actually imposed in competition law until the introduction of section 73A.123 
 
The primary justification given for the criminalisation of cartel conduct is that ‘fear of 
criminal sanctions and jail in particular will deter potential offenders’.124 The deterrence 
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theory supports the reasoning that ‘punishment can only be justified if it leads to the 
prevention or reduction of future crimes.’125 In some cases cartel members apply a ‘cost-
benefit’126 analysis in order to calculate the guarantee of increased financial profitability from 
anti-competitive conduct against the possibility of being detected and prosecuted by 
competition authorities, taking into account the nature and extent of the sanction that will be 
imposed if their operation is uncovered.127 In this way, cartel members are able to determine 
whether the benefits of collusion outweigh the risks of exposure, in deciding whether or not 
to engage in cartel activity. This highlights the need for parliament to create a clear and 
comprehensive framework capable of deterring cartel behaviour by ensuring that ‘sanctions 
are swift, sure and substantial’.128 
 
2.5.3 Arguments against the introduction of Criminal Law sanctions in Competition Law 
 
The imposition of civil and criminal sanctions on individuals for cartel conduct, in addition to 
the administrative penalties levied against their companies, provides greater deterrence from 
such conduct. It can be said that this addition will further discourage and dissuade directors 
from engaging in cartel activity in the first place, thereby reducing the instances of cartels in 
the South African economy generally. However the possible negative effect that such 
sanctions will have on directors’ willingness to serve on boards cannot be ignored. It is 
important to note that although such sanctions are welcomed it does not guarantee results. In 
large countries such as the United States, where criminal sanctions have been in place for a 
number of years, cartels still exist, thus whether such criminal sanctions would have a 
deterring effect in South Africa is yet to be determined. 
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 ‘There is not much empirical evidence that criminalisation actually reduces the instances of 
cartels. The criminalisation of cartel conduct will likely act as a greater punishment for 
offenders, but may not necessarily reduce the instances of cartels.’ 129 
 
2.5.4 What will be the impact of criminal sanctions?  
 
It is impossible to ignore the glaring concerns that arise from the introduction of criminal 
sanctions in competition law, as it may adversely affect the Competition Commission’s 
success with regards to concluding consent orders and persuading leniency applicants to sign 
the CLP.130 It seems blatantly obvious that directors will be reluctant to ‘conclude consent 
orders on behalf of their firms’,131 in light of the extent of their involvement in cartel conduct. 
This is due to that an admission by a firm that it participated in cartel conduct may be used as 
the prima facie basis for securing a criminal conviction against that director in subsequent 
proceedings.132 In view of the fact that it is often the directors of a firm who exercise the most 
influence in the decision of the firm to apply for corporate leniency, their incentive to do so 
may be considerably reduced by the risk of criminal sanctions, including imprisonment.133 
Regard must be had to whether it is necessary to uphold the corporate law principle of 
separate legal personality in deciding whether or not it is just to impose such sanctions. The 
fifteen construction firms that recently reached settlements with competition authorities for 
collusive tendering may be called firms or companies, but one should be conscious of the 
truth that firms or companies consist of natural persons in charge of its decision making 
processes. It logically follows that a firm or company cannot actually collude; only its 
directors can on its behalf.134 This point should be taken into consideration when deciding 
whether such sanctions are appropriate given the legal nature of companies. This aspect will 
be addressed further in chapter 4. 
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The CLP has an impressive track record and it has proven to be a formidable tool in detecting 
cartels as well as an effective mechanism in facilitating the dismantling of cartels by 
encouraging cartel members to disclose information on any cartel activity. A good example of 
this is evident in the construction and infrastructure sector, where much effort was employed 
by the Competition Commission to eradicate cartels, largely based on information received 
through CLP applications.135 The introduction of criminal liability will add a new dimension 
to competition law enforcement, namely the jurisdiction of the NPA and criminal courts in 
the enforcement of criminal sanctions against individuals. This will definitely require a modus 
operandi to be developed with all relevant authorities for the effective implementation of both 
cartel enforcement under the Amendment Act and the criminal prosecution of individuals.136 
 
Criminal liability provisions will place a substantial burden on South Africa’s already 
encumbered criminal justice system, seeing as the enforcement of such provisions will remain 
under the jurisdiction of the NPA and the criminal courts. One should be cognizant of the fact 
that an unwanted consequence of the introduction of criminal penalties is that such sanctions 
are ‘likely to undermine three of the key pillars of competition law enforcement in South 
Africa’.137 Firstly, the Competition Commission presently places a heavy reliance on the 
procedures set out in section 49A of the Competition Act, which gives the Competition 
Commission the power to summon any person believed to have information relating to cartel 
activity to an interrogation. In terms of which that person is obliged to answer questions put 
to him or her at an enquiry held by the Competition Commission under this section, unless 
their answer is self-incriminating. It is clear that if criminal liability were to be introduced, 
almost every question a person answered could potentially be self-incriminating and directors 
would, in most cases, exercise their right not to answer. This practice would significantly 
limit the extent of information provided to the Competition Commission in such enquiries. 
Secondly, it should be noted that to date the Competition Commission has been able to settle 
almost all complaints relating to collusion through the conclusion of consent orders in terms 
of section 49D of the Competition Act.138  This section makes it possible for the Competition 
Commission to process cases expeditiously, accordingly punish offending firms and publicise 
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its enforcement effort. This process was designed to make action simpler, more efficient and 
flexible in order to reduce the cost, length and delays associated with running a full hearing 
before the Competition Tribunal.139 However, directors who fear the imposition of personal 
criminal sanctions are highly unlikely to agree to enter into consent orders on behalf of their 
firms if this could later facilitate prosecution against them. Lastly, attention should be given 
to the fact that the Competition Commission has been able to uncover a number of cartels, 
such as the cartels in the bread and milk industries, after receiving applications for leniency 
from cartel members in terms of the CLP. Regard must be given to the fact that directors are 
less likely to come forward if their own liberties are at stake.140 
 
It is against this background that one should consider the relationship between competition 
law and criminal law in order to ascertain whether such sanctions are necessary considering 




























The Competition Act is an economic statute and as such it is administered and enforced by an 
administrative agency, the Competition Commission.141 The Competition Commission has an 
entirely different role from that of the National Prosecuting Authority (the ‘NPA’), whose 
function it is to prosecute general offences or crimes in terms of its own prosecutorial policy 
and enabling legislation such as the Criminal Procedure Act. Section 12 of the Competition 
Amendment Act introduces one of the most contentiously debated amendments to the 
existing competition law regime in South Africa. The Competition Amendment Act 
introduces an extremely controversial provision, namely section 73A, into the original 
Competition Act which makes provision for the imposition of individual personal criminal 
liability for cartel offences. This provision has raised various concerns that might blur the 
constitutional rights of such individuals concerned as well as the relationship between the 
NPA and the Competition Commission which will be discussed and dealt with later in this 
chapter. 
 
3.2 The Competition Amendment Act  
 
The purpose of the Competition Amendment Act was to amend the original Competition Act: 
 
‘so as to provide certainty with regard to the concurrent jurisdiction between the Competition 
Commission and other regulatory authorities; to introduce provisions to address other 
practices that tend to prevent or distort competition in the market for any particular goods or 
services; to provide more guidance in relation to conducting market enquiries as a tool to 
identify, and make recommendations with respect to, conditions that tend to prevent, distort or 
restrict competition in the market for any particular goods or services; to introduce provisions 
to hold personally accountable those individuals who cause firms to engage in cartel conduct; 
and to authorise the Competition Commission to excuse a respondent to a complaint if the 
respondent has assisted the competition authorities in the detection and investigation of cartel 
conduct; and to provide for matters connected therewith.’142 
 
                                                          
141 Jordaan (note 46 above) 198. 
142 Preamble of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. 
33 
 
The Competition Amendment Act has raised serious questions and has given rise to debates 
concerning an accused director’s rights. It has blurred the lines between the separate legal 
personalities of the company and its directors by introducing criminal sanctions to promote 
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Competition Act. It has created further 
confusion regarding the legal relationship between prosecutions under the Competition Act 
and those under the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.143 
 
3.2.1 The Corporate Leniency Policy 
 
When the Competition Act was drafted, the Corporate Leniency Policy (‘the CLP’), which is 
a policy which grants immunity to a firm from prosecution in exchange for the voluntary 
submission of evidence (as opposed to being summoned to provide evidence) of cartel 
conduct, was not contemplated. Cartel conduct is criminal in nature and the parallel 
enforcement methods envisaged in terms of the Competition Act and the Competition 
Amendment Act have had the effect of ‘muddying’ the proverbial ‘competition waters’ in 
terms of jurisdiction and policy.144 The question as to whether individuals who voluntarily 
submit information to the Competition Commission in terms of the CLP are exposed to 
criminal prosecution or whether individuals who are subpoenaed by the Competition 
Commission to provide evidence, on the strength of the evidence provided by a whistle-
blower in terms of the CLP, are immune from criminal prosecution on the basis of section 
49A(3) of the Competition Act will be addressed below. It is evident that the effect of this 
provision has potentially harsh and seemingly unjust consequences. 
 
The Competition Commission issued the original CLP in 2005 to discourage and prevent 
cartel conduct and encourage its disclosure. It set out the procedure adopted and the 
requirements that to be fulfilled for the granting of immunity.145 The CLP encouraged firms 
engaged in cartel activity to come forward and provide information or expose evidence 
relating to the existence of cartel activity in order to assist Competition Authorities to uncover 
anti-competitive cartel conduct. In exchange, the Competition Commission would grant the 
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first whistle-blower leniency and therefore immunity from prosecution provided the policy 
requirements were met.146 Immunity meant that if a firm were successful in its application for 
leniency, that firm would escape prosecution, adjudication and administrative penalties. 
However the 2005 CLP did not have the impact the Competition Commission had expected it 
to have and raised some policy concerns. Provisions of the policy were therefore amended by 
way of the Competition Amendment Act which introduced section 8 and section 73A. 
 
The revised CLP alleviated these concerns as it sought to refine the CLP’s existing 
framework.147 Section 8 of the Competition Amendment Act codifies the CLP and the 
existing practice of granting corporate leniency to whistle blowers and other persons who 
provide the Competition Commission with information regarding cartel activity.148 The 
section provides that: 
 
‘At any time after receiving or initiating a complaint, the Competition Commission may 
certify, in the prescribed manner and form, and with or without conditions that any particular 
respondent, or any particular person contemplated in section 73A, is deserving of leniency in 
the circumstances.’149 
 
The ambit of the revised CLP is wider than its forerunner and offers greater certainty in 
respect of a number of issues, for example it does not draw a distinction between firms that 
instigated or coerced cartel activity and other members of the cartel.150  
 
It is important to note that this revised CLP does not afford individuals immunity from 
criminal prosecution. Consequently personal liability and criminal sanctions may have the 
effect of deterring potential whistle-blowers from coming forward.151 The probabilities of 
such sanctions reducing the incentives for directors to apply for corporate leniency on behalf 
of their firms are high, given the potential personal risk they may face for their own 
involvement in cartel conduct. This conflict seems to defeat the purpose of the CLP in such 
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instances where a real threat of criminal prosecution arises from voluntary statements made to 
the competition authorities. It seems that individuals faced with this conflict would have to 
choose whether or not to protect themselves from self-incrimination or face potentially 
criminal exposure when voluntarily making statements to the Competition Commission 
regarding their involvement in cartel activities. 
 
The new aspect of the codification of the CLP relates to section 73A which provides that the 
Competition Commission may make submissions to the NPA in support of leniency for any 
person prosecuted in respect thereof but may never fetter the discretion of the NPA.152 The 
Competition Commission has the discretion to request the NPA to institute criminal 
proceedings against a director.153 Though the Commission may choose not to request the 
prosecution of any director who has cooperated with the Competition Commission in terms of 
the CLP, there is nothing that prevents a third party from doing so.154 The Competition 
Commission cannot compel the NPA to grant an individual leniency thus a whistle-blowing 
individual may very well be exposed to criminal liability as a result of their disclosure made 
to the Competition Commission.155  
 
The presumably neat solution was to therefore incorporate the CLP into the Competition Act 
and extend the ambit of its protection to those whistle-blowing individuals who were involved 
in cartel conduct. However as the Competition Commission cannot compel the NPA to grant 
an individual leniency, this solution does not appear to sufficiently address the concern for 
whistle-blowers exposing themselves to criminal liability.156 It is therefore apparent that 
directors of the applicant firm are exposed to personal criminal liability as the CLP does not 
protect them from such liability resulting from their involvement in cartel activity. 
 
At first glance, it appears that the intention of the drafters of the Competition Amendment Act 
was to attend to the public’s call for harsher penalties and a greater deterrent than the levying 
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of administrative penalties against firms engaged in cartel conduct, in an effort to target those 
individuals actually involved.157 Section 73A therefore ensures that the individuals 
responsible for cartel conduct face criminal liability and are accordingly found guilty of an 
offence where they have caused, or knowingly acquiesced to, the firm having engaged in a 
prohibited practice. 
 
The CLP has proven to be an effective tool in not only the campaign to rid the economy of 
cartel activity but in providing firms with an incentive to step forward, expose cartel conduct 
and seek leniency.158  
 
3.3 The Provisions of Section 73A 
 
The NPA derives its mandate from section 179 of the Constitution which expressly empowers 
the prosecuting authority to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry 
out any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings.159 In order for the 
NPA to secure a conviction against an individual who committs an offence under section 
73A, the NPA must prove the following elements: firstly that the person was a ‘director of a 
firm’160 or was ‘engaged or purporting to be engaged by a firm in a position having 
management authority within the firm’161; and secondly that such person caused the ‘firm to 
engage in a prohibited practice or knowingly acquiesced in the firm being involved in such a 
prohibited practice.’162 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the offence created under section 73A imposes personal 
criminal liability to a specified category of persons involved in cartel conduct and is restricted 
to this specific class of persons. In order for one to be found guilty of this offence, one must 
either be a director or a person engaged by a firm in a position having management authority. 
The latter is not defined in the Competition Amendment Act163 but it can be assumed that 
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such a position closely resembles that of a director.164 However this dissertation will solely 
focus on the position of the director and not the position of persons engaged by a firm in a 
position having management authority. 
 
According to the case of S v Daniëls165 the word ‘caused’ indicates that the conduct of that 
person must have been the causal link in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice or anti-
competitive activity. The NPA bears the onus of proving that the conduct of the director  is 
also the legal cause of the firm engaging in that prohibited practice. This requires an inquiry 
into whether there was a sufficiently close connection between the conduct of the accused 
director and the prohibited practice that the firm was engaged in.  
 
The words ‘knowingly aquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice’ specifies that 
the NPA has to prove that the direcor/s knew about the firm engaging in a prohibited practice 
but nevertheless allowed the prohibited practice to take place and failed to take the necessary 
steps to prevent it from happening (or intervene or put a stop to it) once he or she first became 
aware of it.166 The criminal liability imposed on such a director is based on an omission, a 
failure of that director’s duty to act in such a situtaion. It can then be said that where there is 
an omission there is a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties to act positively and in the best 
interests of the firm and its shareholders.167 In order for a director to be convicted of an 
offence under section 73A, he or she must have ‘actual knowledge of the relevant conduct of 
the firm’.168 
 
Section 73A does not therefore create strict liability as there is no burden on the accused 
director to prove due diligence.169 The consequences of committing an offence under this 
section will result in an accused director, upon conviction, being sentenced to a fine not 
exceeding R500 000, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such 
fine and such imprisonment.170 
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3.3.1 Coordination issues arising from the introduction of  Section 73A 
 
3.3.1.1 The possible overlap between the functions of the NPA and the functions of the 
Competition Commission 
 
In order to proceed with prosecution against a director under section 73A, subsection (3)  
requires ‘either that the firm must have acknowledged an infringement of section 4(1)(b) of 
the Act in a consent order, or that the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal 
Court’171  (‘the CAC’)  must have made finding relating to the infringement of section 
4(1)(b).172 Therefore an administrative case under the Competition Act must be established 
before criminal prosecution under section 73A can successfully follow.173 The NPA has been 
given exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the enforcement of section 73A.174 Concern arises 
as the NPA is a separate authority from the Competition Commission which has no expertise 
in the handling of competition law infringements and yet the NPA has exclusive jurisdiction 
over cartel enforcement. This raises concerns of expertise, coordination of cartel cases and the 
critical issue of state resources.  
 
As a consequence, the introduction of criminal law sanctions into competition law and the 
involvement of the NPA in a competition law arena have led to a possible overlap in the 
functions of the NPA and the Competition Commission. The Competition Commission’s 
prerogative is to ‘investigate and prosecute substantive issues’175 of competition law; however 
the authority to conduct a criminal prosecution of a director under section 73A of the 
Competition Act vests in the NPA.176 The Competition Commission is therefore an 
investigative body as its mandate is to investigate issues of anti-competitive behaviour, refer 
prohibited practice complaints to the Competition Tribunal and negotiate settlements based 
on admissions of prohibited practices.177 The Competition Tribunal is the ‘adjudicative body 
of first instance; it makes determinations of complaint referrals’178 from the Competition 
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Commission and also ‘hears appeals and applications for review’179 of certain Competition 
Commission decisions.180 
 
The NPA has exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of section 73A in terms of the 
Constitution and the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 (‘the NPA Act’) which 
provides for a single national prosecuting authority.181 Therefore, unless the relevant 
provisions in the Constitution, the Competition Act and the NPA Act are amended, the 
Competition Commission does not have legal authority to assume responsibility for the 
prosecution of a director who has ‘caused the firm to engage (or knowingly acquiesced in the 
firm engaging) in a prohibited practice.’182 
 
It is important to note that although the NPA has exclusive jurisdiction and authority to 
conduct criminal prosecutions in terms of section 73A, it is only after the Competition 
Commission have made a substantive determination that a contravention of the Competition 
Act has occurred, that the NPA acquires the legal authority to prosecute a director.183 
According to section 73A, it is primarily the duty of the Competition Commission to 
determine whether or not the criminal prosecution of a director is appropriate in the 
circumstances.184  
 
Thus both the Competition Commission and the NPA play crucial roles in the criminal 
prosecutions instituted in terms of section 73A. The efficient enforcement and administration 
of this provision will require a certain degree of cooperation between the Competition 
Commission and the NPA, however there is little guidance given as to the level of practical 
cooperation that should exist between these two agencies.185  
 
It is highly unsatisfactory that the South African parliament did not make use of a framework 
which either included more detail regarding the degree to which the NPA and the 
Competition Commission are to cooperate with one another and coordinate case management 
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or alternatively a framework which afforded the Competition Commission greater 
investigative and prosecutorial powers in terms of section 73A. Uncertainty arises where the 
Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal reveals evidence which is capable of 
establishing the requisite causation or knowing acquiescence of a director. Given the severity 
of the crime and the possibility of criminal prosecution if found guilty, directors have become 
reluctant to cooperate with the Competition Commission and guarded in administrative 
hearings before the Competition Tribunal for fear that they may incriminate themselves and 
provide evidence that the NPA could later use to prosecute them.186 
 
The second coordination issue relates to the CLP. The purpose of the policy is to afford the 
Competition Commission the ‘authority to grant immunity from prosecution to companies’187 
who are the first to disclose their participation in a cartel and assist the Competition 
Authorities in the prosecution of the cartel members. The intention behind the formulation of 
this policy was to create a mechanism to serve as a means to aid detection and investigation 
of cartels. However the final discretion to grant leniency in terms of criminal charges vests in 
the NPA under section 73A and not the Competition Commission. 
 
In terms of section 73A(4)(a), the Competition Commission may not seek nor request the 
prosecution of a person for an offence if the Competition Commission has certified that the 
person is deserving of leniency. However in terms of section 73A(4)(b), the Competition 
Commission may make submissions to the NPA in support of leniency for any person 
prosecuted for an offence, if the Competition Commission has certified that, that person is 
deserving of leniency in the circumstances. It is evident, upon reading both subsections, that 
the authority to grant leniency from criminal prosecution does not lie with the Competition 
Commission but ultimately with the NPA. 
 
The Competition Commission is a single body tasked with the mandate of implementing the 
CLP but is ultimately subject to the NPA in respect of the decision to prosecute in terms of 
section 73A. Thus directors would be inclined to carefully consider any thoughts of 
approaching the Competition Commission for leniency as there is no guarantee that personal 
liberty would not be at risk. It seems as though the drafters of section 73A have inadvertently 
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discounted the incentive that drives the CLP.188 In this regard, it would seem necessary for the 
Competition Commission and the NPA to provide guidance on their coordination in order to 
preserve the efficacy of the CLP. 189 
 
3.3.2 Constitutional issues arising from the introduction of Section 73A 
 
The Competition Amendment Act introduces personal criminal liability for specified classes 
of individuals involved in cartel conduct, but it does not contemplate the effect that this has 
on section 49A(3) of the Competition Act. Section 49A of the Competition Act deals with 
summons and provides that: 
 
‘(3) No self-incriminating answer given or statement made to a person exercising any power 
in terms of this section is admissible as evidence against the person who gave the answer or 
made the statement in criminal proceedings, except in criminal proceedings for perjury or in 
which that person is tried for an offence contemplated in section 72 or section 73(2)(d), and 
then only to the extent that the answer or statement is relevant to prove the offence 
charged.’190 
 
On the basis of the abovementioned provision, any person who is summonsed to provide 
evidence to the Competition Commission and discloses self-incriminating information or 
makes self-incriminating statements regarding his or her conduct during the course of an 
investigation, is afforded protection from criminal prosecution or enforcement arising from 
the statement in question, as it is entirely inadmissible in any criminal proceedings as a 
consequence of the above provision.191 This section gives effect to the fundamental 
constitutional right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence but does not 
compromise the ability of the Competition Commission to gather evidence against a firm 
engaged in cartel conduct in terms of the Competition Act. 
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It seems that the only inescapable conclusion is that these two sections are at odds with one 
another as section 49A(3) advances the constitutional right of an individual against self-
incrimination192 whilst section 73A does not. This consequently gives rise to grave 
constitutional concerns. It is clear that the Competition Act cannot be amended in a 
‘piecemeal’ fashion.193 In light of the underlying goals of the Competition Act and the very 
specific manner in which it is drafted (namely on a quasi-civil basis where the onus of proof 
is on a balance of probabilities), the incorporation of the section 73A amendment is at odds 
with the rest of the Competition Act.  
 
It is argued that in order to introduce into the Competition Act such a fundamentally 
divergent purpose, namely that of prosecuting individuals, requires a comprehensive overhaul 
of the Competition Act in order to ensure adherence to fundamental constitutional rights.194  
It is also important to note that section 73A creates a presumption in the formulation of this 
offence which has an effect on the burden of proof. Section 73A provides that in any court 
proceedings against a person being prosecuted for an offence, an acknowledgment in a 
consent order by the firm, or a finding by the Competition Tribunal or the CAC that the firm 
has engaged in a prohibited practice, will automatically constitute prima facie proof of the 
fact that the firm did engage in that conduct. 
 
From this, it is clear that the provision creates a presumption requiring proof of a ‘basic 
fact’.195 The basic fact that needs to be proven by the State is that an acknowledgment in a 
consent order by the firm, or a finding by the Competition Tribunal or the CAC that the firm 
has engaged in a prohibited practice, constitutes prima facie proof of the fact that the firm 
engaged in that conduct. Once this basic fact has been proven, the presumption is triggered in 
the criminal proceedings against the director of the firm.196 
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The above issues raise questions as to whether the offence created under section 73A has the 
potential to infringe an accused director’s constitutional rights, namely those rights 
guaranteed to an accused person in terms of section 35(3) of the Constitution and in particular 
those rights mentioned in section 35(3)(h).197 Section 35 of the Constitution pertains to the 
rights of ‘arrested, detained and accused persons’ and subsection (3)(h) provides that: 
 
‘3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right: 
     h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings’ 
 
One of the reasons why the Competition Amendment Bill took so long before it was signed 
into law was that a number of constitutional questions were raised regarding its validity. 
These aspects will be dealt with separately in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
3.3.2.1 An Accused Director’s Right to be Presumed Innocent 
 
As a rule, the State is expected to bear the full burden of proving the elements of an offence 
and is prohibited from compelling the assistance of an accused person.198 This forms the 
general principle that underlies the self-incrimination rights of the accused in terms of which 
the presumption of innocence requires the final burden of persuasion to be on the State. A 
failure by parliament to observe the constitutional rights of an accused guaranteed in terms of 
section 35(3)(h) creates a reverse onus which is generally considered to be constitutionally 
unsound.199 This is because if a reverse burden of proof is created, as indicated inter alia by 
the words ‘shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved’, a person may be convicted even 
if a reasonable doubt exists as to his or her guilt. This means that if the accused cannot 
disprove a presumed fact, he or she may be convicted of the crime despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt. In criminal proceedings, a reverse onus refers to the 
shift in the burden of proof. Thus both the right to silence and the right to be presumed 
innocent under section 35(3)(h), have the potential to be infringed upon where a fact is 
presumed to have been proven unless the accused  can disprove that fact.200 
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According to Letsike201, a two-stage test may be applied in order to determine whether a 
reverse onus is constitutional: 
 
‘First, does the provision violate the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the 
accused's guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt? This is so if the provision creates the risk 
of conviction of the accused despite the existence of a reasonable doubt about his guilt.  
Secondly, is it a justifiable limitation in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution? The 
principal considerations are the purpose of the reverse onus provision and the risk it creates of 
the conviction of an accused despite the existence of a reasonable doubt.’202 
 
In terms of Section 73A, the content of subsection (5) has previously caused great unease and 
it seems despite that unease, the subsection has been included, unchanged in the Competition 
Amendment Act. The subsection establishes a potentially problematic presumption that will 
be discussed below. Section 73A(5) of the Competition Amendment Act provides that: 
 
‘In any court proceedings against a person in terms of this section, an acknowledgement in a 
consent order contemplated in section 49D by the firm or a finding by the Competition 
Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court that the firm has engaged in a prohibited practice in 
terms of section 4(1)(b), is prima facie proof of the fact that the firm engaged in that 
conduct.’203 
 
This above section establishes a presumption that a firm has engaged in cartel conduct if it 
has acknowledged this in a consent order or has been found to have done so by the 
Competition Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court.204 This presumption thereby creates a 
reverse onus. A possible reason as to why parliament chose to include this presumption is to 
alleviate the burden on the NPA of having to re-establish an infringement of section 4(1)(b) 
of the Competition Act205 when prosecuting an individual under section 73A. It therefore 
limits the possible defences that could be raised by the individual director facing 
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prosecution.206 However, section 73A has the effect of requiring the competition authorities to 
establish cartel participation on the part of the firm before the NPA has to establish the 
involvement of those in control of the firm. In order to assist the NPA, section 73A(5) creates 
a presumption that the firm did engage in this conduct. It therefore follows that the individual 
facing prosecution cannot argue that section 4(1)(b) has not been infringed. In light of this, it 
could therefore be argued that section 73A(5) does not create a reverse onus but operates so 
as to eliminate potential defences. It is important to note that section 73A(5) does not require 
the accused to discharge this presumption in order to avoid guilt as the onus is still on the 
NPA to prove causation, or knowing acquiescence, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore 
unlikely that a constitutional challenge to this section would succeed. 
 
In S v Zuma,207 the Court held that a presumption of innocence required the State to bear the 
burden of proving the guilt of the accused person beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore the 
guarantee would be infringed if there was a possibility that a person may be convicted despite 
the existence of reasonable doubt. The question as to whether such a possibility exists relates 
to the question of whether such a presumption creates a reverse burden of proof or an 
evidentiary burden.  
 
In Scagell v AG Western Cape,208 the Court held that where only an evidential burden was 
created by the parliament, as indicated by the words ‘prima facie evidence’, the presumption 
of innocence is not infringed because the accused only needed to give evidence which creates 
a reasonable doubt as to the presumed fact. Thus the evidential device that is created is not in 
itself suggestive of any criminal behaviour. In such instances there is no burden on an 
accused person to disprove any element of an offence on a balance of probabilities.209 
 
If one were to only focus on the language contained in section 73A(5) of the Competition 
Act, it would appear clear that a mere evidential burden is created by the words that an 
acknowledgement in a consent order or a finding by the Competition Tribunal is ‘prima facie 
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proof of the fact that the firm engaged in that conduct’.210 However unlike the mandatory 
presumption found in other legislative provisions, the presumption created in section 73A 
does not in itself allow for a conviction in the absence of other evidence capable of raising a 
reasonable doubt.211 The State must still prove all the other elements of the offence, 
specifically that the accused had ‘caused’ the firm to engage in a prohibited practice, or had 
‘knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice’.212 
 
Upon assessing the instruments created by the Competition Act, it can be seen that the 
Competition Commission has been given an oversight role over competition in South Africa; 
it is therefore unlikely that the NPA would prosecute a person unless it is requested to do so 
by the Competition Commission. However, as indicated earlier, the authority to conduct 
prosecutions in terms of section 73A ultimately resides in the NPA and it is therefore still 
possible in theory, although highly unlikely in practice, that such a prosecution could proceed 
where the Competition Commission regards it as unnecessary or inappropriate.  
 
In applying the two stage test, mentioned above, to section 73A(5), it can be concluded 
firstly, that section 73A(5) creates such a risk because an accused ‘may be convicted despite 
the absence of any evidence that the firm had engaged in a prohibited practice’213 and 
secondly, that ‘the apparent purpose of the reverse onus provision in this case is to ensure that 
the finding of prohibited conduct occurs in the Competition Tribunal rather than in the 
criminal courts.’214 
 
It may, however be argued that the reverse onus provision does not serve a legitimate purpose 
for the simple  reason that, in terms of section 35(3) of the Constitution, an accused person 
has the right to a fair trial ‘before an ordinary court’, which the CAC and the Competition 
Tribunal are not. The reality is that there remains a possibility of conviction despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt due to the fact that the accused may not have been party to the 
proceedings in the CAC or the Competition Tribunal which found that the firm had engaged 
in the prohibited practice. It may therefore be argued, on the basis of the application of the 
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above test, that section 73A(5) is therefore not a justifiable limitation of the presumption of 
innocence.215 
 
It can also be concluded that the offence created in terms of section 73A does not in itself 
amount to an infringement of the right to be presumed innocent. Nevertheless, the evidential 
burden created in the section might amount to a prima facie infringement of the accused 
director’s right to remain silent as opposed to his or her right to be presumed innocent.  
 
3.3.2.2 An Accused Director’s Right to Remain Silent 
 
Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution also guarantees the right of an individual to remain silent, 
in addition to being presumed innocent. This section may therefore be extended to apply to 
directors in the context of company law and competition law. The director’s right to remain 
silent becomes relevant because of the presumption created by section 73A. It can be argued 
that such a presumption discharges the State’s onus of proving one of the elements of the 
offence in Section 73A, namely the existence of a prohibited practice.  
 
Under section 73A, proof of the basic fact, as mentioned previously, creates an evidential 
burden that does not automatically result in a presumption of guilt against the accused.216 
Thus it follows that the State will still have to prove the other elements of the offence, namely 
unlawfulness and fault, beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused director can be found 
guilty of the offence. Therefore, if the State is unable to prove the remaining elements of the 
offence, the accused will not be found guilty if he or she chooses to exercise his or her right 
to remain silent.  
 
3.3.2.3 An Accused Director’s Broader Right to a Fair Trial 
 
It is important to remember that the section 35(3) rights of an arrested, detained or accused 
person only exist from the moment that criminal proceedings commence. The presumption of 
innocence that is enshrined in this section requires the State to bear the full burden of proof in 
relation to each element of the offence in question. It is only after the State has established 
each element of the criminal offence beyond a reasonable doubt that the burden of proof 
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shifts to the accused person to create a reasonable doubt.217 This affects the position of a 
director of a firm who, despite having previously come forward and admitting the fact that the 
firm had engaged in unlawful cartel activities to the Competition Commission, is charged 
with the section 73A offence. However the cases of Ferreira v Levin and Vryenhoek v 
Powell218and Bernstein NO v Bester NO219 held that ‘incriminating evidence provided by a 
person in a proceeding of administrative nature may not be used against him in subsequent 
criminal proceedings because that would amount to prejudicing the accused’s right to a fair 
trial.’220 It would therefore seem apparent that a constitutional challenge to section 73A on the 
basis of a prima facie violation of the director’s right to fair trial is unlikely.221 
 
The right to a fair trial is a residual right which includes, but is not limited to, those rights 
mentioned in section 35. The initial purpose of the offence created in section 73A was to 
deter directors of firms from causing their firms to engage in cartel activity and from 
condoning such activity through their passivity while having actual knowledge of such 
activity. The preamble of the Competition Act clearly states that its purpose is, inter alia, ‘to 
hold personally accountable those individuals who cause firms to engage in cartel 
conduct’.222 But also and more importantly, ‘to authorise the Competition Commission to 
excuse a respondent to a complaint if the respondent has assisted the competition authorities 
in the detection and investigation of cartel conduct’.223 
 
It seems apparent that the intention of the drafters of this provision intended for the provision 
to be applied in this manner and that directors’ should not be prosecuted unless the 
Competition Commission made such a request to the NPA. However cognizance must also be 
paid to the fact that section 36 of the Constitution may allow the possible infringement of 
directors’ constitutional rights in circumstances where it is reasonable and justifiable to do so. 
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The presumption created in section 73A serves the legitimate purpose of enabling the NPA to 
institute criminal proceedings against delinquent directors to deter these directors from 
encouraging or allowing such cartel activity by their firms. The section also serves to address 
the social need for the effective prosecution of this particular type of conduct. 
 
It is therefore recognised that the constitutional concerns raised by various observers 
regarding section 73A of the 2009 Competition Act, as introduced by the Competition 
Amendment Act 1 of 2009, are born out of genuine and legitimate fears that directors’ 
fundamental rights may be trampled upon. In particular, the rights invoked in the section 73A 
discourse have been the director’s right ‘to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to 
testify during the proceedings’ and the broader right to a fair trial in general. It has been 
argued that section 73A does not amount to an infringement of any of these particular 
constitutional rights, or the broader right to a fair trial of an accused person. However even if 
section 73A is viewed as a prima facie infringement of the right to a fair trial, it is submitted 
that such infringement would be justifiable given the leading role directors play in their 
company’s affairs and the pressing social need to eradicate cartel and other anti-competitive 
practices in society. 
 
3.3.3 Evidentiary threshold issues arising from the introduction of Section 73A 
 
The evidentiary thresholds that parliament has placed in section 73A are potentially 
problematic. The heading of section 73A reads: ‘Causing or permitting [a] firm to engage in 
prohibited practice’224. The heading contains two of the necessary thresholds that the NPA 
would need to prove in order to successfully prosecute persons under this section. The first 
threshold is that of causation. Section 73A(1)(a) requires that it be shown that a person 
‘caused’ the firm to engage in a prohibited practice contrary to section 4(1)(b). It would 
appear that conventional criminal law relating to causation would be applicable in this regard. 
It would seem that the NPA has to show that the individual in question caused that 
participation beyond reasonable doubt. An issue of consideration for the courts would be to 
decide what evidence counted as causation. The question arises as to whether proof of a mere 
attendance at a cartel meeting would suffice or whether the courts would require evidence of 
an actual cartel agreement with the individual’s signature? 
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In terms of section 73A(1)(b), the NPA is also able to prosecute an individual occupying a 
position of management authority on the basis that he or she ‘knowingly acquiesced’ in cartel 
conduct. Section 73A(1)(b) may prove to be difficult to enforce. It is unclear precisely what 
the prosecution would need to show to establish acquiescence. The section speaks of ‘actual 
knowledge’, this would seem to rule out the possibility of drawing inferences regarding what 
a director ought to have known about the company under his or her watch. It would certainly 
rule out any appeal to constructive knowledge. This phrasing of the section also opens up 
avenues to dispute acquiescence. Firstly, disputing actual knowledge may be fairly 
straightforward if the prosecution is without any actual evidence and secondly, it would seem 
that there is the possibility that a director might dispute allegations of acquiescence. For 
example, it might be possible to craft a defence of conscientious objection along the lines that 
a single director out of a group of directors could not have acquiesced in that he or she had 
consistently objected to involvement in cartel activities, thereby escaping liability. It will be 
challenging for the courts to develop standards around these rather vague thresholds. It will 
be even more of a challenge for the NPA to establish ‘knowing acquiescence’ beyond 
reasonable doubt.225 
 
Insofar as section 73A is concerned, the numerous constitutional concerns to which it gives 
rise have been documented above. One can only surmise that the reason why this provision 
has taken so long to come into force and effect is due in large part to such constitutional 
concerns. In light of the critique proffered above, the question then arises as to whether the 
imposition of criminal liability as contemplated in section 73A is in fact a necessary policy 
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Cartel activity is rampant in the South African economy and a source of growing concern.226 
It remains vital that the law provides adequate sanctions to deter and punish those found 
guilty of such conduct. This chapter focuses on how the law applies to a company as a whole 
and directors individually. It will look at the civil and criminal sanctions or liabilities imposed 
on companies for their involvement in the cartel offence of tender collusion, the possible 
defences that they may raise, any rights of recourse that they may have against the individuals 
responsible and recent case law regarding this matter. It will also provide an analysis of the 
responsibilities and duties placed on directors to prevent cartel conduct, their liabilities in this 
regard both civilly and criminally in comparison to the international trends, and the possible 
defences that they may raise with regard to this offence. 
 
4.2 Liability for Cartel Conduct 
 
Before competition authorities or aggrieved persons can institute legal proceedings for cartel 
conduct, it is important to identify who such proceedings are being instituted against. This is 
important as ‘significant penalties apply where companies and individuals have been found to 
have engaged in cartel conduct.’227  
 
The Competition Act prohibits restrictive horizontal practices and ‘does not allow practices 
which substantially prevent or lessen competition in a market, unless these practices can be 
justified on the basis of technology, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains.’228 The onus of 
proving this burden rests upon the companies engaged in restrictive practices.229 This would 
constitute a defence against a charge of anti-competitive conduct where companies are able to 
prove that their relationship is beneficial to the economy in a favourable sense, and that there 
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are significant advantages which outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the horizontal 
practice in question.230 
 
However, the restrictive horizontal practice of cartel conduct is specifically prohibited by 
section 4(1)(b). The section states that there are three restrictive horizontal practices, namely 
collusive tendering, market sharing and price fixing. Conduct falling within these categories 
is prohibited outright and constitutes practices for which no justification is permitted.231 This 
means that no defence is allowed for these ‘unfair arrangements’.232 In summary, a cartel, as 
explained above, is: 
 
‘ a group of two or more companies who are competitors or potential competitors, who enter 
into price fixing, bid rigging, collusive tendering or market sharing arrangements. Although 
the arrangement often has the effect of lessening competition in the industry or results in one 
or more of the colluding parties excluding other parties from the market, a significant 
lessening or prevention of competition does not have to be proven in a cartel case, as cartel 
conduct is prohibited outright.’233  
 
Section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act applies to agreements between ‘firms’. In terms of 
section 1 of the Competition Act, a ‘firm’ includes ‘a person, partnership or a trust’. Thus, the 
Competition Act currently applies to companies, individuals, partnerships and trusts. 
However, individuals are not yet held personally accountable for engaging in cartel conduct, 
as only firms may be found liable in terms of section 59 of the Competition Act. But once 
section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act comes into operation and inserts section 73A, 
it will be a criminal offence for a director or manager of a corporation to cause the firm to 
engage in cartel conduct or to knowingly acquiesce thereto. Nevertheless, individuals and 
companies that cooperate with the Competition Authorities may face mitigated fines or 
penalties. These points will be discussed below. 
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Where a corporation is found guilty of cartel conduct, it may face an array of penalties. These 
penalties usually fall within the ambit of competition law and are imposed under the 
Competition Act but other areas of the law may apply depending on the level of seriousness 
of the conduct in question and its effects on the economy. 
 
4.2.1.1 Competition law 
 
The Competition Act currently does not provide for criminal sanctions in respect of cartel 
conduct. A contravention of section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act amounts to cartel conduct. 
A company who contravenes this section is ‘punishable through the imposition of an 
administrative penalty’234 by the Competition Tribunal. A ‘firm found to have engaged in 
cartel conduct may be liable to pay an administrative penalty of up to 10 percent of the firm’s 
annual turnover in South Africa (including its exports from South Africa) during the firm’s 
preceding financial year.’235 This penalty may be imposed for non-compliance with 
provisions of the Act in terms of section 59 of the Competition Act.236 Thus offending 
companies found guilty of participation in cartels and contravention of the Competition Act 
may be stripped of productive assets, operating divisions or subsidiaries in order to settle the 
fine. Section 59 of the Competition Act deals with the imposition of administrative penalties 
and provides that: 
 
      ‘(1) The Competition Tribunal may impose an administrative penalty only— 
(a) for a prohibited practice in terms of section 4 (1) (b), 5 (2) or 8 (a), (b) or (d); 
(b) for a prohibited practice in terms of section 4 (1) (a), 5 (1), 8 (c) or 9 (1), if the conduct is 
substantially a repeat by the same firm of conduct previously found by the Competition 
Tribunal to be a prohibited practice; 
(c) for contravention of, or failure to comply with, an interim or final order of the Competition 
Tribunal or the CAC; or 
(d) if the parties to a merger have— 
(i) failed to give notice of the merger as required by Chapter 3; 
                                                          





(ii) proceeded to implement the merger in contravention of a decision by the Competition 
Commission or Competition Tribunal to prohibit that merger; 
(iii) proceeded to implement the merger in a manner contrary to a condition for the 
approval of that merger imposed by the Competition Commission in terms of section 
13 or 14, or the Competition Tribunal in terms of section 16; or 
(iv)  proceeded to implement the merger without the approval of the Competition 
Commission or Competition Tribunal, as required by this Act. 
(2) An administrative penalty imposed in terms of subsection (1) may not exceed 10 per cent 
of the firm’s annual turnover in the Republic and its exports from the Republic during the 
firm’s preceding financial year. 
(3) When determining an appropriate penalty, the Competition Tribunal must consider the 
following factors: 
(a) the nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention; 
(b) any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention; 
(c) the behaviour of the respondent; 
(d) the market circumstances in which the contravention took place; 
(e) the level of profit derived from the contravention; 
(f) the degree to which the respondent has cooperated with the Competition Commission and 
the Competition Tribunal; and 
(g) whether the respondent has previously been found in contravention of this Act. 
(4) A fine payable in terms of this section must be paid into the National Revenue Fund 
referred to in section 213 of the Constitution.’ 237 
 
In addition hereto, companies or individuals who have suffered loss or damage as a result of 
cartel conduct, or other anti-competitive conduct prohibited under the Competition Act, may 
institute civil proceedings against cartel members in order to recover the loss or damages 
suffered.238 There is an increasing trend in the number and quantum of fines levied per 
year.239 It is important to note that the Competition Tribunal has a low-tolerance approach to 
cartel activity and has expressed the view that ‘absent any mitigating circumstance, hard-core 
cartelists deserve the maximum penalty provided for in the Act’.240 
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The CAC has held that an administrative penalty must be considered after a prohibited 
practice, in terms of section 4 of the Competition Act, has been determined. Thereafter, the 
Competition Tribunal must consider all of the relevant factors contained in section 59(3) of 
the Competition Act to reach a decision as to the quantum of the potential fine. It is only after 
reaching a decision as to an appropriate penalty in respect of the first two steps that the 
Competition Tribunal will then ensure the quantum is within the limits set out in section 
59(2).  
 
The Competition Commission and Competition Tribunal have emphasised the fact that full 
and early cooperation or disclosure will be rewarded when determining the extent of the 
penalty that has to be paid in a settlement agreement. They are more likely to impose higher 
penalties on firms that do not cooperate. Other factors that affect the extent of the fine 
include, inter alia, any previous anti-competitive conduct of the particular firm, any previous 
penalties for cartel conduct, the period over which the cartel has been operating and the 
effects it had on the economy.241 
 
It is important to note that first time offenders may be held liable for cartel behaviour that is 
in contravention of the Competition Act.242 First time offenders may thus be held liable for a 
fine not exceeding 10 percent of the firm’s annual turnover in terms of section 59 of the 
Competition Act. Other violations of competition law usually attract a warning for the first 
contravention, often accompanied by a mandatory requirement to cease the offensive 
behaviour in contravention with the Competition Act which is often done by way of 
modifying business practices.243 Further, if the company’s participation in any anti-
competitive behaviour ceased more than three years before a competition investigation is 
commenced, then prescription will apply.244 
 
However, members of cartels should be encouraged to realise the benefits of reporting 
transgressions to the Competition Commission under the CLP in order to mitigate penalties 
and fines. In terms of the CLP, applicants who voluntarily make disclosures and agree to 
cooperate with the Competition Commission in its investigation ‘may be granted immunity 







from prosecution, provided the requirements for leniency have been met.’245 This provides 
firms participating in cartel behaviour with an incentive to provide useful information to the 
Competition Commission which assists in the investigation of cartel activities. However, 
corporate leniency may only be applied for, in respect of cartel conduct, by the cartel member 
that is ‘first to the door’ of the Competition Commission.246 
 
The quantum of any fine imposed upon a firm for anti-competitive conduct by competition 
authorities may substantially be affected by the action plans that the company has established 
to prevent and detect such behaviour.247 The precautionary steps undertaken by the company 
in order to reduce the possibility of the firm engaging in anti-competitive conduct will be 
taken into consideration as mitigating factors in the event that such behaviour is detected. 248 
 
It is often said that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse for non-compliance’249 with the law and 
this applies to competition law as a recent case shows. In the judgment of Reinforcing Mesh 
Solutions (Pty) Ltd and Vulcania Reinforcing (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission and 
Others,250 the CAC provided guidance as to the approach taken by competition authorities 
towards cartel members that rely on ‘passive participation to deny liability’251 the case 
confirmed the view that ‘passive participation in a cartel is sufficient to constitute being a 
party to a cartel.’252 In terms of this case, the Competition Commission alleged that the firms 
had contravened the provisions of section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act which deal with 
price-fixing and market allocation. Vulcania argued that it could not be held legally 
responsible for cartel conduct as it maintained a passive role during meetings and further, that 
they had no intention of complying with the decisions reached at these meetings. Vulcanias’ 
argument was rejected by the Competition Tribunal as it contravened the Competition Act. 
On appeal, the CAC found ‘that passive participation in unlawful conduct without distancing 
oneself from its content could be seen as an indication of tacit approval of the conduct.’253 
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This common law principle is now applied in a competition law context.254 Thus, if the firm 
concerned is proven to have engaged in any one of the prohibited practices, a contravention of 
section 4(1)(b) may be sufficiently established even if the effects thereof are not 
established.255  
 
The CAC stated that ‘it [was] abundantly clear from the wording of Section 4(1)(b) that in 
order to establish a contravention, the Competition Commission [had to] produce proof which 
[showed] an agreement to engage in the prohibited anti-competitive behaviour.’256 According 
to the Act, the term ‘agreement', when used in relation to any prohibited practice, includes ‘a 
contract, arrangement or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable.’257 From this, it 
can therefore be deduced that section 4(1)(b) is not primarily concerned with the effects of 
prohibited agreements between firms in a horizontal relationship or the extent of a firm's 
engagement in the process of reaching that agreement, but it is concerned with the mere 
existence of such an agreement.258 
 
In the above stated case the CAC found that the Competition Commission had established the 
existence of an agreement between Vulcania and the cartel members to engage in anti-
competitive behaviour. The CAC, agreeing with the Competition Tribunal, concluded that 
Vulcania had contravened section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. The CAC reasoning was 
based on the fact that Vulcania did not distance itself from the cartel and its participation in 
the overall agreement was sufficient to establish its liability. The approach taken by the CAC 
in this case falls in line with the European competition law position that ‘passive participation 
without some indication that the firm in question distances itself from the arrangement is 
capable of rendering the firm liable for a prohibited practice.’259 The courts have therefore 
maintained the view that firms cannot rely on ‘internal reservations to dispute the conduct 
which they display outwardly where a prohibited agreement exists.’260 Despite the uncertainty 
surrounding ‘passive participation’, it is submitted that the CAC reached a suitable conclusion 
in holding that Vulcania was liable for cartel conduct.  
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When a firm agrees to become a member of a cartel, it is automatically presumed that the firm 
tacitly agrees to comply with any decision taken by the cartel to engage in anti-competitive 
behaviour, unless the firm overtly opposes any of the cartels’ decisions. Cartel members may 
be regarded to have effectively compromised the detection of a cartel and encouraged its 
continuation in instances where the firm fails to publicly distance themselves from the anti-
competitive initiative or report it to the competition authorities. These cartel members should 
therefore be held fully responsible for their participation in such anti-competitive conduct. 
The aforementioned judgment has set a valuable precedent in deterring both passive and 




In terms of the Competition Amendment Act, directors may in certain circumstances be held 
criminally and/or civilly liable. Once section 73A becomes effective, it will create a criminal 
offence and bring about consequences for directors and managers of corporations who cause 
or knowingly acquiesce the firm to engage in cartel conduct. The consequences imposed by 
this section include personal criminal liability. These sanctions are intended to apply in 
addition to the current sanctions based on reckless trading and reputational damage. Directors 
therefore have the burdensome responsibility of ensuring their firms compliance with 
competition law in order to protect not only their firms but themselves from unnecessary 
litigation. 
 
‘Some breaches of competition law, such as the rigging of tenders, allocation of markets and 
the manipulation of prices are so obviously anti-competitive that any ethical business person 
would know that they are wrong.’262 A director, given the nature of his or her position, is 
fundamentally required to have a thorough knowledge, awareness and understanding of the 
laws governing competition and actions that result in contraventions of the Competition Act 
in order to prevent his or her firm from engaging in unlawful behaviour.263 A director’s 
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‘ignorance of the law is no excuse for non-compliance’264 and thus does not constitute a 
defence.  
 
The imposition of liability on directors is a contentious point. It remains unclear as to whether 
these individuals should be prosecuted under the auspices of competition law, criminal law or 
company law for their roles in cartel conduct. As a result, the liability they face may vary 
depending on the type of action taken against them. The following section will therefore 
analyse the legislation in its current form. 
 
4.2.2.1 Directors liability in terms of Competition law 
 
Both criminal and administrative sanctions may be pursued in respect of the same conduct in 
cartel proceedings. However this requires a finding by the Competition Tribunal of cartel 
conduct in order to pursue either a criminal or civil claim. It is not possible to pursue civil 
damages if such a finding has not been made. The Competition Amendment Act specifically 
caters for a situation in terms of which an administrative sanction may be imposed on a 
corporation while criminal sanctions may, subsequently, be brought against the respondent 
firm’s directors. Action may only be taken against directors for a criminal offence once there 
has been a finding by the Competition Tribunal or the CAC that the respondent firm has 
engaged in cartel conduct, or the respondent firm has entered into a consent order with the 
Commission. Furthermore, a person or firm may only pursue a claim for civil damages once 
there has been a finding that the respondent firm has engaged in a prohibited practice (the 
cartel conduct).265 
 
Under the Competition Amendment Act, directors of firms who cause or knowingly 
acquiesce in collusive tendering, market division or the fixing of prices and trading conditions 
under section 4(1)(b), who are subsequently found guilty of contravening section 73A of the 
Competition Amendment Act will in future, once Section 73A becomes effective, be held 
liable to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment or a maximum fine of R500,000, or both a 
fine and imprisonment. Section 73A requires ‘either that the firm must have acknowledged an 
infringement of section 4(1)(b) of the Act in a consent order, or that the Competition Tribunal 
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or CAC have made a finding of infringement’266 in terms of section 4(1)(b). The Competition 
Act states that if these requirements are satisfied, a director, or person having management 
authority, may be prosecuted.267 
 
Furthermore, section 73A(6) (signed but not yet in force) provides that a firm is precluded 
from ‘(i) paying any administrative penalty imposed on an individual; and/or (ii) 
indemnifying, reimbursing, compensating or otherwise defraying the expenses of any 
individual incurred in defending such a prosecution unless the prosecution is subsequently 
abandoned or the person acquitted’.268 It is important to note that a similar provision exists 
under company law such as section 77(3)(b) and section 78(6) of the Companies Act.  
 
In terms of section 73A(4) of the Competition Amendment Act, ‘the Competition 
Commission may not seek or request the prosecution of a person for an offence in terms of 
section 73A if the Competition Commission has certified that the person is deserving of 
leniency in the circumstances.’269 Whilst immunity granted in terms of the CLP extends to all 
forms of prosecution initiated and enforced by the competition authorities and the NPA in 
terms of the Competition Act, such immunity does not extend to various parallel criminal 
offences engaged in by individuals employed by the firms who have been found to have 
engaged in cartel behaviour.270 The CLP does not seem to contemplate the fact that an 
individual may expose himself or herself to criminal liability when voluntarily making a 
statement to the Competition Commission which implicates him or her in cartel conduct. 
Individuals will become increasingly aware of this (and at a minimum should be informed of 
their right not to self-incriminate), and unless they are provided with assurances that 
information disclosed to the Competition Commission may not be used in parallel criminal 
proceedings, such individuals will be reluctant to assist the Competition Commission in 
uncovering cartels.271 ‘As a director of a company, one would be almost certain to think twice 
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before approaching the Competition Commission for leniency without guarantees that one's 
own liberty is not at risk.’272  
 
As the CLP did not extend its immunity to individuals, the Competition Amendment Act 
made provision for this by introducing a section which is not yet in full force, but relates to 
individual leniency for persons who provide information or otherwise cooperate with the 
Competition Commission’s investigation into cartel conduct. In terms of section 50 of the 
Competition Amendment Act, the Competition Commission may, at any time after receiving 
or initiating a complaint, certify that any particular person contemplated in section 73A is 
deserving of leniency in the circumstances. Thus when immunity or leniency is granted to a 
corporate defendant, its current and former employees may be prosecuted for a cartel offence 
only in instances where the relevant firm has acknowledged, in a consent order, that it 
engaged in cartel conduct or in instances where the Competition Tribunal or the CAC has 
made a finding that the relevant firm engaged in cartel conduct. However if a firm is granted 
total immunity in terms of the CLP, its directors or managers, current and former, cannot be 
prosecuted for cartel conduct.273 
 
The contemporary competition law regime fails to provide for directors to be held personally 
liable for the company's anti-competitive conduct In other words, the individuals involved in 
cartel conduct will not face prosecution under the Competition Act. Such a restriction has not 
deterred those seeking justice from pursuing alternative avenues in an effort to take action 
against and hold those actually responsible for such conduct liable, as relief may be sought 
under other branches of law.274 
 
4.2.2.2 Directors liability in terms of Company law 
 
Company law comprises that area of law that governs a director’s relationship with his or her 
firm. In terms of that relationship, a director owes certain responsibilities and duties to his or 
her company. It is important to understand the context of this relationship as a company 
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wishing to recoup or recover losses incurred as a result of the director’s unlawful conduct for 
competition law violations, should be able to do so within the ambit of company law.  
 
It is important to note that since directors are not held personally liable for cartel conduct 
under the current competition law, they remain untouchable by competition authorities.275 It 
would, therefore, seem that company law remains a possible avenue of law that could provide 
companies with a remedy so that they could take actions against those individuals responsible 
for cartel conduct. 
 
4.3 Directors’ Responsibilities, Duties and Liabilities 
 
4.3.1 The Common Law duties 
 
Prior to the 2008 Companies Act, directors’ rights and duties were derived primarily from the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘the 1973 Act’), contracts entered into with the company, the 
memorandum of incorporation, articles of association and the common law. The common law 
imposes both a fiduciary duty and a duty of care and skill on directors.276 
 
‘A fiduciary is a person who is in a special position of trust’277 and confidence. ‘A director is 
a fiduciary and therefore must act in good faith in his dealings with or on behalf of the 
company and he must exercise the powers and fulfil the duties of his’278 or her office 
honestly. Fiduciary duties are non-negotiable and cannot be waived in any manner or form.279 
Fiduciary duties require a director  to act with an unfettered/unbiased discretion to observe 
any limitation of powers; to use his powers for the purpose for which they were conferred and 
intended (i.e. ‘proper purpose’); and to avoid a personal conflict of interest between their 
personal interests and those of the company.280  
 
Directors also have the duty to act with a certain amount or degree of care and skill or they 
will be liable to the company for their negligence when performing their functions for the 
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company. Therefore, even if the director lacks the intention to cause prejudice to the 
company, they will be held liable where they performed their functions in a negligent 
manner.281  
 
4.3.2 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
It must be noted that the Companies Act partially codifies the common law, and incorporates 
in its provisions some of the common law principles282. However, this is only a partial 
codification and thus the Companies Act must always be considered in conjunction with the 
common law. The common law provides a fiduciary duty on directors. It is accepted that a 
director, in his capacity as a director, owes a fiduciary duty to his company. This means that 
directors, when acting as individuals and as a board, must act in good faith and for the benefit 
and in the best interests of the company as a whole. In this regard the company is the 
beneficiary of the duty.283  
 
The Companies Act partially codifies both the fiduciary duties and the duty of care and 
skill.284 Section 76 of the Companies Act makes provision for the codification of the fiduciary 
duties of directors; as well as the standards of conduct required to be performed and exercised 
by directors; whilst section 77 explains the basis and the extent of liability imposed on 
directors for breach of these duties. In the common law, wrongs were decided on a case by 
case basis whereas under the Act there is a clear list of wrongs that can constitute liability.285 
It is important to note that the Companies Act does not exclude the common law, but applies 
in addition to it. In the event of a conflict between a statutory provision and the common law 
provisions, the statute will apply.286 
 
Section 66(1) of the Companies Act codifies the powers of the board and states that: 
 
‘The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its 
board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions 









of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise.’ 287 
 
Essentially, shareholders rights are restricted to appointing directors to run the company for 
them. In turn directors have an obligation to assure themselves that they do not expose the 
company to the risks of unlawful and anti-competitive conduct in terms of section 76 the 
Companies Act. Shareholders consequently run the risk of directors acting fraudulently and 
involving the company in cartel activity. However if shareholders do not like the manner in 
which their company is being run, they have the right to remove the defaulting director. 
 
It is important to note that the Companies Act which, while providing for the personal civil 
liability of directors (in terms of section 77 and section 22(1) of the Companies Act) and 
criminal liability for fraud (in terms of section 214 of the Companies Act), remains silent on 
whether directors involved in cartel offences should face criminal prosecution.  
 
‘Section 77, as read with section 22 of the Act, penalises and holds directors personally liable 
for any loss incurred through knowingly carrying on the business of the company recklessly 
or with the intent to defraud creditors and other stakeholders.’ Section 214 creates criminal 
liability for those directors trading a company in a manner which is calculated to defraud a 
creditor.’288  
‘Section 22(1) states that a company must not: 
(a) carry on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, with intent to defraud any person or 
for any fraudulent purpose.’289 
 
‘Section 77 (3) states that any director of a company is liable for any loss, damages or costs 
sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director having: 
 (a) acquiesced in the carrying on of the company’s business despite knowing that it was being 
conducted in a manner prohibited by section 22(1); 
 (b) been a party to an act or omission by the company despite knowing that the act or 
omission was calculated to defraud a creditor, employee or shareholder of the company, 
or had another fraudulent purpose’.290 
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According to the Companies Act, the word ‘knowing’ is defined ‘as a person either having 
actual knowledge, a person who has investigated the matter to an extent that would have 
provided the person with actual knowledge; or a person who has taken other measures which, 
if taken, would reasonably be expected to have provided the person with actual knowledge of 
the matter.’291 It is imperative to note that the definition of ‘knowing’ in the Companies Act is 
similar to the definition of ‘knowingly acquiesced’ in section 73A of the Competition 
Amendment Act. Thus, only directors who are shown to have had a legitimate interest in the 
prosperity of the company and whose decisions have been made in the best interests of the 
company, whilst carrying on the business of the company, would have a valid defence against 
such claims.292 Enquiries conducted as to the affairs of a company will always involve an 
evidential investigation into whether a director has carried out the business of the company in 
accordance with sound legal business practices and has fulfilled his or her fiduciary duties.293 
The law provides directors with a defence to any action instituted in terms of section 77, in 
appropriate and objective circumstances, where a director can show that he or she has 
complied with what can be reasonably expected of a reasonable director placed in the same 
situation or faced with similar circumstances as that director.294  
 
Section 76(3) of the Companies Act provides that ’a director acting in his capacity as a 
director, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of a director in good faith and 
for proper purpose; and act in the best interests of the company with the necessary degree of 
care, skill and diligence that is reasonably expected.’295 Further, the Companies Act provides 
that directors ‘may only use their position, or any information which they become aware of 
whilst holding that position, to the advantage of the company. They are therefore prohibited 
from any personal gain or to knowingly causing harm to the company.’296 It therefore follows 
that a person who accepts their appointment as a director, agrees in principle, to act in 
accordance with certain standards listed in section 76 of the Companies Act which encourages 
directors, whilst acting in their capacity as directors, to be responsible and accountable for 
their actions.  
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It is also important to note that the Companies Act applies to all directors as it draws no 
distinction between executive, non-executive and independent non-executive directors. 
Section 76(2)(ii) specifically provides that ‘directors must not use the position of director, or 
any information obtained while acting in the capacity of a director, to knowingly cause harm 
to the company.’297 Thus the Companies Act does not contain provisions which is directly 
applicable that specifically provides for the imposition of personal criminal and civil liability 
on directors for corporate crimes such as tender collusion which is an anti-competitive 
practice. 
 
It is often said that prevention is better than a cure. Directors should be encouraged to create a 
risk management framework which assesses the prevailing laws and regulations affecting the 
company. An assessment of the company’s compliance with competition laws is an important 
risk management strategy which is often overlooked.298 Directors should use this as a means 
to assess the internal regulations and procedures established by the company to mitigate the 
risks of anti-competitive behaviour. Furthermore, directors should develop internal policies, 
which include internal penalties, and compliance programmes, which prohibit anti-
competitive behaviour within the company. 
 
Following a director’s conviction under section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act, 
section 78 of the Companies Act (still to become effective) provides that a company will be 
prohibited from directly or indirectly paying any fine imposed on a ‘director of the company, 
or of a related company, who has been convicted of an offence in terms of any national 
legislation.’299  
 
In future, fines personally incurred by directors as a result of anti-competitive behaviour, in 
contrast with fines levied against the company, ‘will result in increased personal risk of 
liability for the directors in their personal capacity, without the prospect of assistance from 
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the company.’300 Companies may only assist in paying directors’ legal costs if the prosecution 
is abandoned, or the director is acquitted.301 
 
Section 162 of the Companies Act states that a director may be declared ‘delinquent’ if such 
director grossly abuses the position of his office ‘intentionally; or, by gross negligence, 
inflicts harm upon the company or a subsidiary of the company contrary to section 76; or acts 
in a manner that amounts to gross negligence, willful misconduct or breach of trust in relation 
to the performance of the director’s functions within, and duties to, the company or as 
contemplated in section 77 of the Act.’302 
 
4.3.3 Criminal Law 
 
Criminal law is aimed at punishing unlawful conduct. Given the fact that a corporation is an 
artificial entity and not a natural person, liability can be imputed to the corporation for crimes 
committed by its employees or agents. Therefore criminal liability may be imposed on a 
corporate body vicariously. However this form of liability is much wider than that of natural 
persons. Section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the ‘Criminal Procedure 
Act’) imputes the criminal fault of an individual to a corporation, even though that individual 
may have acted beyond the course and scope of their employment duties but with the ‘intent 
of furthering the corporations’ interests.’303 However many have debated the constitutionality 
of section 332(1) and argue, in the context of criminal conduct, that ‘while fault may exist on 
the part of the delinquent committing the crime, there need be no fault on the part of the 
company. A company can therefore be morally blameless according to the convictions of the 
community and nevertheless still be convicted.’304 Thus even though a company is a fictitious 
person, it still has legal personality and can be held to be ‘morally blameless’.305  
 
The Competition Act does not currently provide for criminal penalties or sanctions in respect 
of cartel conduct, except in circumstances where persons engaged in cartel behaviour 
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knowingly disclose false information to the Competition Commission or attempt to mislead 
the Competition Commission in the course of its investigation.306 However, the NPA may 
pursue action to hold directors or executives criminally liable for their involvement in cartel 
conduct. 
 
It seems that little thought has been given by individuals to their potential criminal exposure 
when voluntarily making statements to the Competition Commission regarding their 
involvement in cartel activities in terms of the CLP, as these statements may be used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings against them by the NPA.307 However, this is an anticipated 
consequence of the CLP. These individuals are however often given amnesty by their 
companies if they cooperate with competition authorities. If they choose not to cooperate, 
they may face disciplinary proceedings or worse face the risk of losing their employment 
should such activity subsequently be discovered.308 Competition authorities do not consider 
individuals’ criminal liability as section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act is not yet of 
force and effect. However, the involvement of individuals in certain types of cartel conduct 
may meet the elements for the common law crime of fraud or they may be guilty of the 
general offence of corruption, as expressed in various provisions of Parts 1 to 4  of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (‘the Corruption Act’).309 
 
Criminal liability can apply to an offence involving the procurement and withdrawal of 
tenders in terms of the Corruption Act.310 Offenders can face possible sanctions in terms of 
their company being registered on a tender defaulter list, a fine of up to R100 million or up to 
life imprisonment.311 Although competition law does not make provision for individuals to be 
held accountable for anti-competitive conduct, competition authorities may pursue those 
involved in a cartel under the auspices of the Corruption Act, which applies to corruption in 
both the private and public sectors. The Corruption Act creates the general offence of 
corruption and criminalizes corrupt activities. This route may be used to charge the directors 
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or executives who engaged in the construction cartels price-fixing, market allocation and 
tender collusion.312  
 
Although the private sector bears little responsibility for corruption, there is no doubt that 
tender collusion is rife not only in the public sector but in the private sector of the economy as 
well.313  The effects of cartel activity in both sectors are far reaching and should be properly 
punished in order to deter future offenders.314 The Corruption Act states that anyone who 
offers or accepts gratification in order to improperly influence the procurement of a contract 
will be guilty of an offence. 315 Individuals convicted of offences under section 12 and 13 of 
the Corruption Act may face fines as well as prison sentences.  
 
Criminal liability is also provided for under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act316 
(‘POCA’). In terms of POCA, a person who engages in cartel behavior may be found 
criminally liable under the common law offence of fraud, and an offence involving 
racketeering in terms of this can result in the guilty party being liable for a fine of up to R100 
million or imprisonment for up to 30 years.317 However it is important to note that both the 
Corruption Act and POCA currently provide for criminal sanctions for tender collusion in 
certain circumstances. 
 
4.4 Recent Developments in South African Competition Law Regarding Tender Collusion 
 
In the course of 2013, the Competition Commission dealt with allegations concerning 
collusive tendering between 15 construction firms in South Africa after effectively 
implementing its fast-track settlement process for the first time.318 These firms were alleged 
of contravening section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act.319 As a result thereof, twenty-one 
firms responded to the Competition Commission’s offer of early settlement and three hundred 
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instances of bid rigging were uncovered.320 The settlements revealed that the construction 
cartel had been in operation for some time, and that collusion was widespread in the 
construction market. The firms Group 5, Construction ID and Power Construction will be 
investigated further and possibly prosecuted for any contraventions as they have not settled 
with the Competition Commission. The construction cartels and fast-track settlement process 
generated intense public interest in South Africa as many of the construction projects 
connected with the cartel were publically funded.321 
 
However the fines imposed by the Competition Commission on these 15 construction 
companies ‘have resulted in wide-spread public out-cry.’322 These construction firms recently 
reached settlement agreements with the Competition Commission in relation to collusion and 
bid-rigging. Combined fines of R1.46 billion were imposed after an investigation was 
conducted into collusion over certain building contracts, including those contracts involving 
the construction of the stadiums for the 2010 Soccer World Cup. The Competition 
Commission ‘investigated 140 projects in both private and public sectors tendering between 
2006 and 2011.’323 This investigation was reportedly the ‘biggest collective fine ever imposed 
on South African companies.’324 While this may appear to be a landmark investigation 
signalling the development of competition law enforcement mechanisms, the quantum of the 
administrative fines imposed on these companies have not impressed most observers who 
seek the further punishment and criminal prosecution against the directors directly involved 
as the fines imposed are ‘financially insignificant for these multi-billion rand corporations.’325 
These public outcries highlight the need to establish a precedent that such anti-competitive 
conduct will not be tolerated or merely passed off as a ‘cost of trading’ and that ‘further 
punishment is a necessity.’326 
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Despite the fact that cartel conduct is an undeniably damaging form of anti-competitive 
behaviour, it is questionable as to whether section 73A will be capable of practical 
implementation by the South African competition authorities.327  
 
The CLP provides a system which allows firms that admit to the allegations of collusive 
tendering to conclude settlement agreements. Firms, being civil claimants, do not have the 
burden of proving this collusion. The burden in this respect rests upon the State. ‘This 
removes some pressure of having to satisfy the already higher burden of proof required for 
criminal, as opposed to administrative, sanctions. If firms are unwilling to cooperate, then 
such proof will be more difficult to establish.’328 
 
At present, competition law regulations lack provisions pertaining to the prosecution of 
individual directors for their involvement in cartel conduct. This effectively means that the 
individuals involved in cartel conduct will not be subject to prosecution under the 
Competition Act. Whether the NPA will succeed in prosecuting individuals involved in cartel 


























The harm caused by collusive tendering cartels is significant and greater emphasis should be 
placed on the deterrence of cartel conduct.329 The imposition of a fine often defeats the 
purpose of the law in this context, to bring those in violation of the law to justice. It seems 
highly unsatisfactory to impose a fine on a juristic person given that it is an artificial entity. In 
some cases such fines are merely written off as a cost of trading by that juristic person. This 
illustrates the need for alternative preventative measures and enforcement mechanisms that 
have real deterrence value. Thus, the introduction of criminal sanctions against individuals 
may serve to be an effective alternative solution if implemented in the correct manner. The 
threat of criminal sanctions against individuals appears to be a greater deterrent than the 
imposition of a civil fine on the company as it targets those actually responsible. The threat of 
imprisonment would force these decision-makers to reassess their cost-benefit analysis 
thereby facilitating an effective deterrence mechanism. 
 
The introduction of criminal sanctions for cartel offences such as tender collusion is, in 
principle, a welcome development in competition law that brings South Africa in line with a 
number of larger countries and places even more emphasis on deterrence.330 However the 
manner in which this is being done in South Africa is problematic. The Competition 
Amendment Act lacks sufficient detail, potentially detracts from the established practice of 
the CLP and contains vague evidentiary thresholds around which the courts will need to 
develop benchmarks.331 
 
As previously mentioned, the Competition Amendment Act was enacted by Parliament in 
2009 but the provisions relating to the criminalisation of cartel conduct have not yet come 
into force through proclamation by the President. It is to date not known when these 
provisions will come into force. Thus this remains a pertinent topic which the NPA should 
consider in relation to the recent construction cartel matters. It is submitted that the delay in 
giving effect to these provisions is caused by the criticism and resistance to the introduction 
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of criminal sanctions by various stakeholders.332 It is recognised that the constitutional 
concerns raised by various observers regarding section 73A are born out of genuine and 
legitimate fears that directors’ fundamental constitutional rights may be impinged upon.333  
 
There are various constitutional concerns relating to the criminalisation provisions of the 
Competition Amendment Act as they are currently framed, with regard to the burden of proof 
placed on any defendant with respect to subsequent criminal proceedings.334 It remains to be 
seen if the constitutionality of the new section 73A of the Act will be sent to the 
Constitutional Court for a review a posteriori.335 However, it is submitted that section 73A 
does not amount to an infringement of the right to be presumed innocent, the right to remain 
silent, the right not to testify during proceedings and the broader right to a fair trial of an 
accused person. It is further submitted that even if section 73A is viewed as a prima facie 
infringement of the aforesaid constitutional rights, that such infringement would be 
reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, given the leading role directors play in their 
company’s affairs and the pressing social need to eradicate cartel and other anti-competitive 
practices in our society.336 
 
Besides these constitutional concerns relating to a person’s rights to remain silent and to be 
presumed innocent, in terms of the rules of evidence, findings by the Competition Tribunal 
are arguably not admissible evidence in any subsequent court proceedings, owing to the 
different standards of evidence and proof required for competition proceedings before the 
tribunal.337 If this is correct, a significant practical difficulty is that it is likely to be difficult 
and time consuming for the NPA to prosecute and secure convictions against individuals for 
cartel conduct, as the NPA would likely have to lead all evidence of cartel conduct anew 
before a court in order to obtain a conviction. While the Competition Amendment Act does 
allow for the Competition Commission to make submissions to the NPA regarding persons 
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being prosecuted for an offence that is regarded as ‘deserving of leniency’, it is not clear how 
this will work in practice. These practical difficulties will place an enormous burden on the 
resources, skills and expertise not only of the NPA but of the courts as well. However, it is 
submitted that the recommendations made hereunder would be a helpful step towards a way 
forward. 
 
Regardless of all the flaws present in section 73A, such a provision is needed in South Africa 
given the failure of current legislation to adequately hold those individuals responsible for 
tender collusion personally liable. The introduction of criminal sanctions can be justified by 
the apparent failure of administrative fines imposed on firms or the civil enforcement 
administration as a whole to provide sufficient deterrence of cartel behaviour.  
 
As a concluding remark, it seems appropriate to assert that there are sound reasons for 
regarding horizontal restrictive practices in competition law as crimes. Unlike other anti-
competitive conduct, considering secretive nature of a cartel and the incentive of cartel 
members to increase their profits at the expense of the general economy, cartels bear the 
resemblance of purely criminal conduct. The criminalization of cartel conduct in order to hold 
directors personally accountable reflects society’s need to attain justice by seeking to target 
the masterminds behind anti-competitive conduct in the South African economy. The reasons 
attached to criminalization are wide-ranging. Criminal sanctions for cartel conduct in South 
Africa have the potential to create a strong deterrent mechanism, given that the only sanction 
presently imposed is otherwise weak in the form of administrative fines. However, once these 
criminal sanctions come into effect, cognisance must be taken of the fact that detection, 
investigation and prosecution of such schemes become a more challenging task. Likewise, 
there are higher evidential burdens to overcome. It is therefore equally important to 
understand that an operational CLP is the cornerstone of effective cartel enforcement. Tight 
judicial control with regards to legal proceedings and effective case management 










Having regard to the contents of this dissertation as well as the concluding remarks, 
recommendations are set out below which assist in addressing some of the issues considered 
herein. 
 
5.2.1 Is there still a need for Section 73A given the constitutional and coordination issues? 
 
It is submitted that there is a need for section 73A, despite the various constitutional and 
coordination issues it poses as it provides an avenue for the Competition Commission to hold 
those actually responsible for cartel conduct accountable. Although other legislation and the 
common law criminalise certain types of cartel conduct, they do not serve as a substantial 
discouragement for individuals to engage in cartel conduct. Section 73A allows the NPA to 
prosecute individuals in terms of specific legislation.338 
 
However section 73A raises several concerns that need to be addressed in order for it to 
become an effective piece of legislation. Firstly, the development of a framework governing 
the extent and degree of cooperation required between the Competition Commission and the 
NPA needs to be installed in order to address the issue if coordination. This should be done in 
addition to ensuring that the NPA has adequate resources to guarantee effective 
prosecutions.339 Furthermore, the current version of section 73A of the Competition Act may 
need to be altered to avoid the creation of hesitation amongst willing applicants for leniency 
given the possibility that subsequent criminal proceedings may be instituted against them. 
The provision, in this respect, has the effect of undermining the generally positive effect that 
criminal sanctions have on leniency policies.340 It should also be ensured that section 73A is 
capable of enduring constitutional review and that its provisions concerning the director’s 
right to a fair trial are absolutely consistent with the Constitution.341  
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If these concerns are remedied, then there would remain no reason as to why the introduction 
of criminal sanctions in the Competition Act, in addition to the imposition of an 
administrative penalty, should not be enforced. In this regard, the introduction of criminal 
sanctions in competition law constitutes a bold step forward towards a more effective way of 
exposing and dealing with cartels in South Africa.342 
 
Moreover, it should be stressed that if section 73A is to become effective, it will be necessary 
for the entire Competition Act to be assessed and amended holistically in order to ensure that 
it does not infringe the fundamental constitutional rights of individuals, and to ensure that it 
reads as a singular cohesive piece of legislation.343 In doing so, careful consideration should 
be given to the fundamental policy objectives of the Competition Act. This should be done to 
account for the various amendments that the Competition Act has undergone over the years as 
there may have been a shift in the purpose of the Competition Act and if so, then such 
amendments would have given effect to amended policy objectives.344 
 
 
5.2.2 Directors’ liability for Cartel Conduct 
 
While Section 73A contains legislation giving the NPA and the Competition Commission the 
power to hold accountable those individuals responsible for cartel conduct, it does not contain 
a provision relating to the possible civil action a company, corporation or wronged party 
could take against that individual to recoup or recover a portion of the loss the corporation 
suffered as a result of its involvement in cartel conduct via that individual. Although it is 
acknowledged that company law provides an avenue for the offending corporation to recover 
or recoup loss from directors under various provisions relating to that director’s recklessness, 
misconduct, etc., it is recommended that a specific provision should be included within 
section 73A in the ambit of competition law regarding this, rather than resorting to company 
law. Since it is a competition law infringement, there should be legislation which obliges that 
guilty individual to compensate the firm to which they belong so as to provide a form of 
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justice to the firm which may have been unaware of that individual’s actions. Given the fact 
that a firm found to have engaged in prohibited conduct under competition law is liable to an 
administrative fine, the individual responsible for that firm’s participation in cartel conduct 
should compensate the firm a percentage of the administrative fine which the firm had to pay 
as a result.  
 
Therefore, should the competition authorities not wish to criminalize cartel conduct under 
section 73A, it is recommended that individuals, specifically the directors (and not just their 
firms), should be liable for the payment of administrative fines, based on the level or degree 
of their involvement in the cartel.345 Individuals who know that they could be personally 
civilly liable for fines worth millions of Rands, would be more hesitant to engage in or allow 
their firms to engage in cartel activities, or, if they are already engaged in such activities, they 
might reconsider their involvement.346 The fines imposed should be punitive enough to 
convey an effective echoing message to other cartels because the risk of a heavy fine should 
outweigh the cartel members’ benefit from their involvement in the cartel. 347 However until 
such legislation is passed, firms should still be encouraged to hold their directors accountable 
under the ambits of company law as discussed in chapter 4. 
 
5.2.3 Coordination issues 
 
The Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal are currently unable to cooperate 
with the NPA in its efforts to prosecute individuals involved in cartel conduct in terms of the 
common law crime of fraud or in terms of POCA with regard to information provided to them 
pursuant to summoning or ordering an individual or firm to give evidence to them which is 
self-incriminating.348 Even if such evidence were made available to the NPA, it would be 
inadmissible in any criminal proceedings. 
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Ironically, any evidence provided to the competition authorities on a voluntary basis does not 
appear to be afforded the protection of section 49A(3), and it thus appears that the 
Competition Commission could cooperate with the NPA to prosecute individuals who make 
self-incriminating statements in leniency applications via the CLP.349 However, whether the 
Competition Commission wants to cooperate with the NPA is another matter in itself as there 
are no guidelines governing the extent or limitation of their cooperation with one another.350   
 
It is submitted that even if the Competition Commission were, hypothetically, obliged to   
cooperate with the NPA, it would be detrimental to the economy as it would give rise to 
highly inequitable results and would be likely to have a negative effect on the submission of 
leniency applications. This in turn would be detrimental to the policy objectives of the 
Competition Act.351  
 
The Competition Act currently provides two avenues of options open to the Competition 
Commission regarding this matter.352 The first is for the Competition Commission to 
cooperate with the NPA in order to seek to ensure that such individuals are not prosecuted as 
their cooperation with the Competition Commission would result in the uncovering of a 
cartel, and in order to ensure that future individuals are not dissuaded from giving evidence to 
the Competition Commission in terms of the CLP.353 But this is not an ideal solution as the 
discretion of the NPA to prosecute an individual cannot be fettered by any third party, 
including the Competition Commission.354 The second avenue is for the Commission to 
subpoena or summon evidence from a whistle-blower pursuant to receiving and granting a 
leniency application. On this basis any self-incriminating statements made in the leniency 
application should be inadmissible in any criminal proceedings by virtue of the operation of 
section 49A(3). It is submitted that this avenue is far more plausible than exercising the right 
not to make self-incriminating statements.355 
 
The Competition Amendment Act provides that any finding of cartel conduct by a company 
by the Competition Tribunal shall serve as prima facie proof in subsequent criminal 










proceedings that the company engaged in a prohibited practice. The Competition Commission 
and the Competition Tribunal have publicly criticised the criminalisation provisions on the 
basis that they are likely to undermine the Competition Commission’s ability to detect, and 
the NPA’s ability to prosecute, cartels through the CLP.356 As a result, directors will be less 
likely to come forward and reveal the existence of cartels through the Competition 
Commission’s CLP if they face the possibility of criminal sanctions, as they do not have 
guarantees of absolution from prosecution by the NPA. 
 
In terms of the Competition Act, the firm is likely to receive leniency, and, most importantly, 
there is no risk that individuals’ statements can later be used against them in criminal 
proceedings. In the absence of the extension of the above protection, individuals who have 
been involved in cartel conduct are less likely to make self-incriminating statements to the 
Commission in leniency applications. Thus a firm which is alleged to be involved in cartel 
conduct is less likely to step forward and make use of the CLP. This is clearly not in the 
public interest, nor does it advance the objectives of the Competition Act 
 
The ultimate onus on the NPA of proving the elements of section 73A beyond reasonable 
doubt, is made even more difficult to discharge by these fundamental flaws. It would have 
been preferable for the Competition Commission to have been given a greater role in the 
enforcement of section 73A to economise on state resources, instead of placing the entire 
burden of doing so on the NPA. While it can be acknowledged that this would have required 
more considered and nuanced legislative amendments which would have taken a longer 
period of time to draft and implement, adopting this approach would undoubtedly have 
benefitted competition law enforcement in the long run. It is evident that the downside to 
criminalizing cartel behaviour is that other government departments, such as the Department 
of Justice, would have to play a significant role in prosecuting cartels. This may lead to time 
delays in liaison between the different authorities. It is therefore recommended that cartels 








5.2.4 Alternative sanctions for construction cartels 
 
Another highly debated possible deterrent is the barring or blacklisting of companies found 
guilty of cartel conduct from the submission of future tenders. This type of deterrence 
strategy has been applied in other fields of law for instance the blacklisting of entities that 
have committed acts of fraud or corruption against local authorities. A blacklist or register of 
entities or individuals who contravene competition law sanctions should be entered onto a 
database which is constantly updated and properly administered to ensure that such entities or 
individuals are barred from, for example, competing for a tender. However, the effects of 
barring companies are difficult to predict in a South African context. It would also be difficult 
to predict the reaction of companies found guilty of cartel activity who would subsequently 
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